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Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland
Takes a New Tack
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, 2 which regulated attempts
to gain corporate control by means of tender offer. 3 A majority of
the Court agreed only that the law violated the commerce clause.4
Three Justices also found that federal tender offer legislation preempted the Illinois Act under the supremacy clause of the Constitu, tion. 5 Although it set few clear standards, 6 the MITE decision did not

a

1. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.51-.70 (1981) (repealed 1983). A majority of states
had enacted similar legislation. See Sargent, On the Validity ofState Takeover Regulation: State
Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 Omo ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981).
3. The precise definition of a "tender offer" remains unsettled. It is generally regarded as an
invitation publicly made to all shareholders of a corporation to sell their shares at a specified
price. See E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CoRPORATE CoNTROL 70 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as TENDER OFFERS]; see also Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer"
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1250 (1973); Note, Defining
Tender Offers: Resolving a Decade of Dilemma, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 520 (1980).
The popularity of the tender offer lies in its flexibility and effectiveness in comparison to the
primary alternative method for gaining corporate control, the proxy contest. The tender offer is
a flexible method because the tender offeror is under no duty to buy up any tendered shares if the
total is less than the percentage stated in the offer. To the extent that the tender offeror buys up
stock, it has an investment in the target which, even if the offer is ultimately unsuccessful, may be
sold without significant loss. By contrast, expenses incurred in an unsuccessful proxy fight are
relatively irrevocable. Moreover, tender offers are an effective means of gaining control because
they can be structured to give target management little time to build up defenses and they avoid
the proxy machinery, over which target management may have substantial control. See L. Loss,
F'uNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 568 (1983); Note, The Constitutionality of State
Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 872, 872 n.2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Response to Great Western]; see also E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, PROXY CoNTESTS FOR CoRPORATE CoNTRoL 585-99 (2d ed. 1968) (early discussion of the trend to acquire
by means of tender offer rather than proxy contest).
4. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens and O'Connor joined Justice White's
opinion of the Court holding that the Illinois statute placed impermissible indirect burdens on
interstate commerce. Four Justices, Burger, White, Stevens and O'Connor, found that the Illinois Act was also invalid because it placed a direct burden on interstate commerce.
5. These Justices were Burger, White and Blackmun. The dissenting Justices, Brennan, Marshall and Rehnquist, did not reach the merits because they believed that the case was moot.
6. In pre-MITE decisions most lower federal courts invalidated state takeover laws on two
grounds, holding both that the state laws were preempted by federal tender offer regulation and
that the laws violated the commerce clause. See cases cited at note 44 infra. The commerce
clause test applied by the Supreme Court in MITE called for balancing the burdens the Illinois
statute placed on interstate commerce against the local benefits it produced. See notes 75-83
infra and accompanying text. This test provides few clear standards for evaluating the constitutionality of new and different forms of state takeover legislation. Had the court been able to
agree on some version of preemption analysis, it might have quieted the controversy surrounding
the constitutional status of state takeover regulation. Resolution of the preemption issue would
have required definition of the policies behind federal tender offer regulation and an examination
of the effect state regulation has on those policies. See Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism:
Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REV. 813, 842-45 (1984). Such an
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explicitly prohibit all state efforts in the tender offer area. 7 Thus, certain state legislatures have responded with what might be termed a
"second generation" of takeover legislation. 8 Their objective is to
avoid constitutional conflict while retaining a meaningful regulatory
role for the states in the takeover process.
This Note examines the approach recently adopted by the Maryland legislature in special session one year after the Supreme Court's
decision in MITE. 9 Maryland has departed radically from the regulatory approach of first generation statutes; 10 however, this Note argues
that the statute has failed to escape the constitutional infirmities of its
predecessors. 11 Part I outlines the various mechanisms that regulate
acquisition of corporate control: the federal tender offer regulatory
mechanism known as the Williams Act, 12 state takeover legislation
such as the Illinois statute invalidated in MITE, and the new Maryland statute. Part II analyzes the debate concerning the constitutionality of state takeover legislation. Part III applies this analysis to the
examination in MITE would have perhaps provided lower federal courts with more guidance in
dealing with the new state takeover statutes.
7. The commerce clause balancing test leaves greater room for state efforts in the tender offer
area than does preemption analysis. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell, J,,
concurring in part) ("I join •.• [the view that the balancing test invalidates the statute] because
. . . [this] Commerce Clause reasoning leaves some room for state regulation of tender offers."),
8. While most states simply amended or repealed those aspects of their takeover laws the
Supreme Court found objectionable in Edgar v. MITE Corp., a number of states developed new
methods for regulating takeovers. Most of the new state statutes follow one of three models: the
Ohio approach, the Maryland approach, or the Pennsylvania approach.
Under the Ohio statute, Omo REv. CoDE ANN.§§ 1701.01, .11, .37, .48, .831, .832, 1707.01,
.042, .23, .26, .29, .99 (Baldwin Supp. 1983), the acquisition of controlling blocks of target shares
requires an affirmative vote of target shareholders approving the acquisition. The Maryland legislation, MD. CoRPS. & AssNS. CoDE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603 (Supp. 1984), imposes
supermajority voting requirements and fair price provisions on business combinations such as
mergers. The Pennsylvania statute, 15 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1408(B), 1409.l(C) (l)-(3),
1910 (Purdon 1984-85 Supp.), restricts the voting rights of "interested shareholders" in certain
corporate transactions such as mergers and provides disinterested shareholders a right of redemption for their shares if a person or group acquires 30% of the corporation's stock.
Because the statutes are recent, they have yet to generate much law review commentary.
However, a few articles by attorneys practicing in states with the new statutes have appeared.
See Krieder, Fortress Without A Foundation? Ohio Takeover Act II. 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 108
(1983); Newlin & Gilmer, The Pennsylvania Shareholder Protection Act, 40 Bus. LAW. 111
(1984); Scriggins & Clarke, Takeovers and the 1983 Maryland Fair Price Legislation, 43 Mo. L.
RE.v. 266 (1984); see also Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing
Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CoRP. L. REV. 3 (1984).
9. See MD. CoRPS. & AssNS. CoDE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 3-603 (Supp. 1984).
10. First generation statutes focus on the tender offer for a controlling interest in the target
corporation. The Maryland statute is aimed at regulating what the tender offerer may do (e.g.,
attempt to force a merger) after it has gained working control. The Maryland approach does,
however, affect certain types of tender offers known as "two-tiered" or "two-step bids." See notes
48-49 infra.
11. For an article on the Maryland statute that takes a contrary position, see Scriggins &
Clarke, supra note 8.
12. The Williams Act added to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d)-(e) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)-(e) (1982)) and § 14(d)·(f) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
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Maryland approach. It argues that while a court may find that the
Maryland approach fails the commerce clause balancing test employed
in MITE, the Maryland approach is most clearly subject to attack on
the ground that it is incompatible with congressional objectives embodied in the Williams Act. Thus, the Maryland statute will force the
courts to readdress the preemption issue left unresolved in MITE. 13
I.

THE REGULATORY MECHANISMS

A.

The Williams Act

It is important to see how first generation statutes, such as the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, built on the Williams Act. Originally,
one of the greatest attractions of the cash tender offer device 14 was the
speed and secrecy with which an offeror could gain control of the target corporation. 15 This benefit to tender offerers worked to the disadvantage of target shareholders who were forced to make important
investment decisions in a short period of time. 16 The Williams Act is
designed to protect investors. It attempts to give investors the time
and information necessary to evaluate critically the terms of a tender
offer by imposing disclosure and substantive requirements on tender
13. See note 6 supra.
14. Depending on the type of consideration offered, a tender offer may be described as an
exchange offer or a cash offer. In an exchange offer, tendering shareholders receive securities in
exchange for their shares. In a cash tender offer, tendering shareholders give up their equity for
cash.
Cash tender offers have proven to be more popular than exchange offers in the hostile takeover bid setting. Exchange offers are subject to more cumbersome registration requirements than
cash offers. See note 15 infra. The greater speed and surprise of the cash offer device benefits
tender offerers by minimizing the time for target management to set up a defense or for other
offerers to make a competing bid. See Troubh, Purchased Affection: a Primer on Cash Tender
Offers, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1976, at 79, 80.
15. The Williams Act was designed to correct a perceived gap in federal securities law. See
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 550]; H.R. REP.
No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CoNG. & An. NEWS 2811, 2814
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1711, reprinted in 1968 U.S. ConE CoNG. & An. NEWS].
Proxy contests for corporate control had long been regulated under § 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982). In the tender offer context, exchange offers
had also long been subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77(a)-(h), 77(j) (1982). Cash tender offers, however, had remained unregulated under
federal law until the Williams Act. Although the Williams Act originally regulated only cash
offers, Congress extended the coverage of the Act in 1970 to include exchange offers. Act of Dec.
22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982)). For some
early commentary on the Williams Act, see, e.g., Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate
Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149 (1966) (supporting federal regulation); Mundheim, Why
the Bill on Tender Offers Should Not Be Passed, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May 1967, at 24
(against federal regulation).
16. See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 15, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 1711 at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
ConE CoNG. & An. NEWS at 2812, supra note 15 ("[B]y using a cash tender offer the person
seeking control can operate in almost complete secrecy.••• [T]he investor is severely limited in
obtaining all of the facts on which to base a decision whether_ to accept or reject the tender
offer.").
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offerors. 17
The Williams Act provides that a person who acquires 18 beneficial
ownership of more than five percent 19 of the shares of a publicly held
corporation registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange
Act20 must disclose detailed information concerning its identity, background and plans for the target. 21 Disclosure must be made on the
date of the commencement of the tender offer.22 Target management
is also subject to the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. 23
17. Senator Williams, the chief sponsor of the Act, explained the purpose of the bill before
Congress: "This legislation will close a significant gap in investor protection under the Federal
Securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders when persons
seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer ••.. " 113 CONG. REc. 854
(1967). See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24-37 (1977) (discussing the legislative
histocy of the Williams Act).
18. The Williams Act regulates a number of methods for acquiring shares in a target corporation. Section 13(d) governs open market purchases and private negotiations. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d) (1982). Section 14(d) governs tender offers. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1982).
19. The 5% figure represents congressional intent to insure disclosure of securities accumula·
tions that have the potential for affecting corporate control and hence the market value of the
security. The Williams Act originally mandated disclosure upon 10% acquisition. Congress
lowered the figure to 5% as part of the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act in order to provide
public disclosure at a more meaningful level. See Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its
1970 Amendments, 26 Bus. LAW. 1637 (1971).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78(e) (1982). Section 12 applies to issuers engaged in or affecting interstate
commerce whose securities are either listed on a national securities exchange or are held on
record by at least 500 persons if the issuer has total assets exceeding $1 million. The $1 million
figure has recently been increased to $3 million by the SEC under its rulemaking authority in
order to account for inflation. Sec. Ex. Act of 1934 Release No. 18,647, 25 SEC Dock. (CCH) 49
(1982).
A significant number of corporations that are quoted over the counter and do not meet the
alternate section 12 requirements are therefore exempt from section 14(d) of the Williams Act.
Insofar as states limit the reach of their takeover statutes to tender offers for exempt corporations
they may successfully avoid a constitutional challenge on preemption grounds. This Note fo.
cuses on the application of state takeover statutes to tender offers that are covered by section 12
of the 1934 Act and section 14(d) of the Williams Act.
21. The acquirer must fill out a Schedule 13(D) (for private negotiations or open market
purchases), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982), or a Schedule 14(D) (for tender offers) § 78n(d)
(1982). The information required in each is substantially the same. The acquirer must disclose
its background and identity, the source and amount of funds to be used in making the purchases,
and its purpose in making the purchases (e.g., to gain control of the target in order to merge it
with another corporation or to sell the target's assets). The SEC is authorized to require addi·
tional information in order to protect investors. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982). The required
additional information is set out in SEC Rule 14d-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-6 (1984). For a general
discussion of the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, see Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure
In Connection With Cosh Takeover Bids: The New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAW. 19 (1968).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1984). SEC Rule 14d·2 defines
"commencement" of the tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1984). In contrast, a Schedule
13(D) must be filed within ten days after acquisition of five percent of the target's shares. 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l (1984). The earlier filing date for tender of·
fers, as compared to open market purchases or private negotiations, reflects a congressional con·
cern for the increased speed afforded by the tender offer device in gaining corporate control.
Empirical Research Project, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: New Importance For
An Old Battleground, 7 J. CoRP. L. 689, 732 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Research Project].
23. Section 14(d)(4) of the Williams Act requires that anyone who recommends to target
shareholders to accept or reject a tender offer must comply with SEC rules and regulations. 15
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Despite the pro-management bias of the earlier versions of the Act, 24
the final version attempts to equalize offerors' and target management's opportunity to appeal to the stockholders.2s
The Williams Act also contains three substantive provisions regulating public tender offers. The object of these provisions is to protect
investors by alleviating some of the pressure inherent in deciding when
or indeed whether to tender their shares. These provisions regulate
the withdrawal rights of tendering shareholders, 26 the tender offeror's
duties to purchase shares when an offer is oversubscribed,27 and the
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1982). The SEC has provided disclosure requirements that must accompany
such recommendations in Rule 14d-9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1984).
SEC Rule 14e-2 requires the target company to address its stockholders on the question of
how they should respond to the offer. The target company must publish a statement within 10
business days of the tender offer indicating that management: (1) Recommends acceptance or
rejection of the offer, (2) Expresses no opinion and is remaining neutral toward the offer, or (3) Is
unable to take a position with respect to the offer and explains the reasons for this inability. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1984).
24. Fears that management and investors had to be protected from corporate "raiders" provided the initial impetus behind federal tender offer regulation. See 111 CoNG. R.Ec. 28,257
(1965) (Remarks of Sen. Williams) ("[T]he Federal Securities laws remain inadequate in one
notable respect. They fail to take proper cognizance of the activities of corporate raiders."); see
also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. l, 30 (1977).
25. According to the Senate Committee:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in
favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. The bill is designed
to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
S. REP. No. 550, supra note 15, at 3. The shift away from the antitakeover stance of the original
Williams Bill is an important indicator of congressional intent in tender offer regulation. The
legislative history of the final version of the Act suggests Congress determined to leave tender
offer markets relatively unfettered in recognition that tender offers may benefit target investors
and the national economy. See notes 87-111 infra and accompanying text.
26. The Act provides for withdrawal rights within the first seven days of the offer and 60
days after the offer becomes effective. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). The object of this provision
is to give tendering shareholders an opportunity to reconsider their offer of stock for tender if, for
instance, target management sheds new light on the desirability of the offer or if there is a competing offer. See 113 CoNG. R.Ec. 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). Section 14(d)(5) empowers the SEC to extend the withdrawal period if necessary to protect investors. The SEC has
extended the period to 15 business days from the commencement of the offer. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-7(a)(l) (1984).
27. In the situation where a tender offer is made for less than all of the total outstanding
shares of the target (a partial offer), the offer may be oversubscribed. The Act requires the tender
offeror to take up tendered shares pro rata according to the number of securities tendered by each
stockholder in the first 10 days of the offer. If the consideration for target shares is increased, a
new pro rata period is applicable for 10 days after the increase. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
This provision was designed to reduce the pressure on a target shareholder to sell his or her
shares quickly. Originally, tender offerors purchased securities on a "first come, first served"
basis. The pro rata provision insures acceptance of at least a portion of a shareholder's shares
submitted within the appropriate time period. Safe in this knowledge, the shareholder may take
the time necessary to assess the offer instead of feeling compelled to tender immediately for fear
of the offer being oversubscribed. See 113 CoNG. R.Ec. 856 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams);
Hearings on H.R. 14475 and S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1968) (remarks of Manuel
F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC).
A recent rule promulgated by the SEC has extended the pro-rata period to include the entire
offer period. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984). The SEC expressed the view that the 10-day period
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consideration paid to tendering shareholders. 28 In addition to these
three substantive provisions, the Williams Act contains an anti-fraud
provision. This provision makes it unlawful to make any untrue statement or material omission or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative practices in connection with any tender offer. 29
B. First Generation State Takeover Legislation

After Congress passed the Williams Act, state legislatures began to
develop tender offer regulation of their own in order to correct perceived weaknesses in the federal regulatory scheme. While state efforts
in this area are hardly uniform, first generation statutes often contain
certain core provisions. Some of these provisions are simply more
stringent cousins of the disclosure and substantive provisions of the
Williams Act. 30 However, provisions for notification of state authorities and target management before commencement of a tender offer, 31
administrative hearings and fairness determinations concerning the
terms of a tender offer, 32 and "friendly" offer exemptions33 are unique
did not give target shareholders enough time to consider the merits of an offer given the confusion generated by changing proration periods (in the event of increased consideration) and multiple proration pools (in the event of competing tender offers). See Proposed Pro Rata Rule, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 18,761, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
~ 83,222 (May 25, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Release No. 18,761]. The SEC has been criticized
for exceeding its rulemaking authority in promulgating Rule 14d-8. See notes 157-60 infra and
accompanying text.
28. If a tender offeror increases the consideration offered to nontendering shareholders, that
increase must be paid to all tendering shareholders, whether the shares were tendered before or
after the increase. 15 U.S.C. § 78n{d){7) (1982). The purpose of this provision is to insure equal
treatment of all tendering shareholders. See H.R. REP. No. 1711 at 11, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 2821, supra note 15.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). This provision applies to the statements and omissions of
anyone who attempts to influence the decision of investors faced with a tender offer. Thus, it
applies to target management as well as to the tender offeror.
30. Most state takeover statutes require tender offerors to disclose more information than is
required by the Williams Act. See, e.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 22-1902(b) (Supp. 1984); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 417E-3(c) (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. § 552.05(2)(c) (1981); see also Note, A Failed
Experiment: State Takeover Regulation After Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 456,
463 (discussing the disclosure provision of the Illinois Act).
State statutes also often extend the substantive protections of the Williams Act. Some man·
date longer withdrawal periods. Se'e. e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 45.57.010(2) {1984) {21-day with·
drawal right); DEL. CoDE. ANN. tit. 8, § 203{a)(2) (1983) {20 days); cf. note 26 supra (SEC
Rule). Others extend the proration period for the duration of the offer. See, e.g., MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. llOC § 7 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984);
CoDE ANN.§ 35-2-80(4) (Supp. 1983).
Hawaii does not permit partial offers. HAWAII REv. STAT.§ 417E-2(3) (1982); cf. note 27 supra
(SEC Rule).
31. The notification period varies among the states. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 1602
(McKinney Supp. 1984-85) (no extra period); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264.25 (1980) (10-day
period); Illinois Business Take-Over Act § 4, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.54(E) (1981)
(repealed 1983) {20 days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78B-4(a) (1981) {30-day period); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 417E-3(f) (1976) (60 days). By contrast, the Williams Act requires only that the tender
offeror file its disclosure statement on the day of the commencement of the offer. See note 22
supra and accompanying text.
32. Many state takeover statutes provide for mandatory or discretionary administrative re·
view of materials disclosed by the tender offeror in order to insure compliance with statutory
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to state statutes.
The professed intent34 behind these provisions is to give investors
more time to consider the merits of a tender offer. 35 Proponents of
state takeover legislation suggest that such an intent is consonant with
congressional design. 36 But, the effect of most first generation statutes
is to delay the effectiveness of a tender offer. 37 Opponents of state
takeover legislation argue that the delay produced by state statutes
impermissibly upsets the Williams Act's neutral balance between
tender offerors and target management by making it easier for target
management to defeat a tender offer.~ 8 If the state statutes undermine
requirements. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. llOC, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984);
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 1604 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). In the case of the Illinois Act invalidated in MITE, a hearing could be called for the purpose of determining the substantive fairness
of the offer. Illinois Business Take-Over Act§ 7, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2 § 137.57E (1981)
(repealed 1983). Substituting administrative judgments concerning fairness for market controls
has been heavily criticized. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 719; Note, supra note 30, at 463-64.
33. Many state takeover statutes exempt from coverage those tender offers that are approved
by target management and are subject to shareholder vote. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT.
§ 45.57.110(2)(E) (1980); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 451.904(2)(d) (West Supp. 1984-85) (enforcement of statute enjoined as a probable burden on interstate co=erce in Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982)). The friendly offer exemptions arguably
benefit investors by inducing tender offerors to negotiate with their fiduciaries, target management; however, these exemptions have been construed as primarily benefiting management. See
note 38 infra.
34. The stated purpose of most state statutes has been to provide increased investor protection. Some states, however, clearly wanted to protect in-state management from the threat of a
takeover. Compare Illinois Business Take-Over Act § 1.1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2,
§ 137.51-1 (1981) (repealed 1983) (investor protection), with 1976 KY. ACTS 534 (codified at KY.
REV. STAT. §§ 292.560-.630 (1981)) (prevention of takeover bids). Moreover, despite the declared statutory goal of investor protection, many co=entators believe that many statutes were
designed to attract corporate domiciliaries or to remove in-state corporations' incentive to
reincorporate in a state with a more favorable statute. If such a parochial intent may be attributed to the state statutes, they are subject to a strong co=erce clause and preemption attack.
See Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Competency, 62
CoRNELL L. REv. 213, 241-53 (1977); Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. l, 18 (1976); Note, Commerce Clause
Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1159 (1974). But
cf. Note, Response to Great Western, supra note 3, at 895-905 (questioning why state statute's
proffered purpose should be rejected).
35. Pre-commencement notification and administrative hearing provisions can slow down
the tender offer process. Such provisions make it easier to insure full disclosure and help to
reduce the pressure atmosphere surrounding a tender offer. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 716-19;
Note, Response to Great Western, supra note 3, at 916; Note, Securities Law and the Constitution:
State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 524 (1979).
36. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 717; Note, supra note 35, at 524; Note, Response to Great
Western, supra note 3, at 916.
37. Both proponents and opponents of state takeover statutes agree that the statutes introduce delay into the takeover process. Sargent, supra note 2, at 717 (proponent); Wilner & Landy,
supra note 34, at 9 (opponents). The constitutional issue is whether by introducing this delay the
states have overstepped the bounds of permissible regulation.
38. See E. ARANow, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS
FOR CoRPORATE CoNTROL 225-29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPMENTS]; Langevoort,
supra note 34, at 249; Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 687, 700
(1975); Wilner & Landy, supra note 34, at 25-29. Delay may benefit target management for a
number of reasons. Management gains time to implement defensive tactics such as amending the
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the federal policy embodied in the Williams Act then they are subject
to attack under the preemption doctrine. 39
Delay of the effectiveness of a tender offer may also impermissibly
burden interstate commerce.4-0 However, even more constitutionally
suspect under the commerce clause are the jurisdictional provisions of
many first generation state statutes.41 Under these state statutes a state
could regulate tender offers for targets incorporated and doing business in other states if a required percentage of target shareholders reside in the forum state.42 The extraterritorial reach of state takeover
legislation may subject tender offerors to the difficult task of complying with the varying requirements of different state statutes.43 This
possibility, when coupled with state statutory provisions that tend to
delay the tender offer process or otherwise aid target management, has
led courts to strike down first generation state takeover legislation on
commerce clause grounds, preemption grounds, or both. 44
corporate charter, searching for a friendly corporation or "white knight" to make a competing
bid, or having the target buy up its own stock. On defensive tactics see generally DEVELOP·
MBNTS, supra, at 193-202; TENDER OFFERS, supra note 3, at 219-76.
Even if target management abstains from employing defensive tactics, delay will permit market forces to work to management's advantage:
A target's most effective defensive tactic is to stall for time, allowing market forces to make
it undesirable for shareholders to relinquish their securities. A public announcement of a
tender offer will stimulate open-market purchase of the target's securities by present shareholders or speculators expecting to realize a quick profit on their short term investment.
Active trading will raise the price of the target's securities, and, as the market price draws
closer to the tender offer price, the economic incentive for shareholders to sell their stock
will fade.
·
Wilner & Landy, supra note 34, at 10 (footnotes omitted).
Friendly offer exemptions do not create delay, but have been criticized as pro-management
devices inconsistent with the regulatory neutrality of the Williams Act. See Great Western
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v.
Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Sargent, supra note 2, at 698; Shipman, Some
Thoughts About the Role ofState Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE W. RBs.
L. RBv. 722, 767 (1970).
39. See notes 84-85 infra and accompanying text.
40. See notes 76-77 infra and accompanying text.
41. See note 69 infra.
42. For example, the Illinois Act at issue in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982),
applied to a tender offeror acquiring at least 5% of the outstanding shares of a target corporation.
The statute defined a target as a ciirporation in which Illinois shareholders owned 10% of the
class of securities subject to the tender offer or for which any two of the following conditions
were met: (1) the corporation had its principal executive office in Illinois; (2) it was organized
under Illinois law; (3) it had at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented
within the state. Illinois Business Take-Over Act§ 2.10, ILL. RBv. STAT. ch. 121-2, § 137.52-10
(1981) (repealed 1983).
43. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 502 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[T)he disruptive effects of
the Illinois Act could be duplicated by other states seeking simultaneously to assert jurisdiction
over a tender offer."), affd. sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). However, this
criticism is "somewhat muted" with respect to the Illinois Act, which permitted, under its com·
ity provision, the state administrator to defer to other jurisdictions in appropriate circumstances.
MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 502 n.31.
44. For some pre-Edgar v. MITE decisions, see, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181
(3d Cir. 1980) (granting preliminary injunctive relief against the New Jersey takeover statute on
the ground that the statute was likely to be declared preempted by the Williams Act); MITE
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C. Maryland Statute
In 1976 the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Maryland
Corporate Takeover Law. 45 This statute, like most first generation
state takeover legislation, regulated the tender offer as a means of gaining corporate control. In September, 1982, a federal district court
ruled Maryland's 1976 Act unconstitutional on preemption and commerce clause grounds. 46 In a June, 1983, special session, the Maryland General Assembly passed a bill that adopts a new approach to the
problems of corporate takeovers and state protection of stockholders'
interests.47 The Maryland statute regulates what is often called the
second "step" or "tier" of a takeover process.48 Instead of regulating
the tender offer process itself, the new statute regulates what course of
Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), affd. sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982) (Illinois statute invalidated on preemption and commerce clause grounds); Great Western
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978) (Idaho statute invalidated on preemption
and commerce clause grounds), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Natomas Co. v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981) (Nevada
statute invalidated on preemption and commerce clause grounds); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F.
Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (enforcement of Pennsylvania statute enjoined on preemption and
commerce clause grounds); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981) (New
Jersey statute invalidated on preemption and commerce clause grounds); Hi-Shear Indus. v.
Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 97,804 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980)
(enforcement of South Carolina statute enjoined on preemption and commerce clause grounds).
But see AMCA Intl. Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio statute valid);
Hi-Shear Indus. v. Neiditz, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1197,805 (D. Conn.
Dec. 3, 1980) (Connecticut statute will not be invalidated unless state administrator exercises his
statutory discretion in such a way as to conflict with the Williams Act or place impermissible
burdens on interstate commerce). The Ohio statute was later invalidated on preemption grounds
when the SEC adopted a rule that was inconsistent with the Ohio precommencement notification
provision. See Canadian Pacific Enters. (U.S.), Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio
1981).
For some post-MITE decisions, see, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d
1425 (10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma statute invalidated on commerce clause grounds); Telvest, Inc.
v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia statute invalidated on commerce clause
grounds); National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri Takeover
Act invalidated on preemption and commerce clause grounds); Agency Rent-A-Car v. Connolly,
686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts statute not preempted by Williams Act, case remanded for consideration of the statute's validity under the commerce clause); Bendix Corp. v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982) (Maryland statute invalidated on preemption and commerce clause grounds). But see Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d
906 (8th Cir. 1984) (Minnesota statute not facially unconstitutional if narrowly construed).
45. 1976 Md. Laws 1712 (codified at MD. CoRPS. & AssNs. CoDE ANN. §§ 11-901 to 11-908
(Supp. 1984)).
46. Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982).
47. The emergency bill, simply named House Bill No. 1, repealed and reenacted with amendments Mo. CoRPS. & AssNs. CooE ANN. §§ 3-202, 8-301(12) & 8-301(13). New sections, MD.
CORPS. & AssNs. CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 through 3-603 inclusive and § 8-301(14) were added.
48. In the first tier or step of a "two-tier'' takeover bid the offeror gains control of the target
through open market purchases of target shares, privately negotiated purchases or a tender offer.
In the second step, the purchaser or tender offeror uses its control to obtain complete ownership
of the target usually by merging the target corporation into itself. See Toms, Compensating
Shareholders Frozen Out in Two-Step Mergers, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 548, 548 (1978); Comment,
Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Federal and State Law to an Innovative
Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 389, 389-92 (1982).
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action a tender offeror may take after it has succeeded in gaining a
controlling interest in the target.4 9
The Maryland statute responds to concerns over the vulnerability
of minority target shareholders after a successful tender offeror assumes control. so By virtue of its controlling interest, the tender offeror
may be able to make fundamental changes in the target's corporate
structure against the will of the remaining target shareholders. 51 The
Maryland General Assembly found most objectionable the tender offeror's ability to "freezeout" 52 minority shareholders at a price lower
49. The Maryland statute does, however, regulate "front-end loaded two-tier lender offers."
That is, instead of making an offer for 100% of the target shares at one price the two-tier tender
offerer may announce that it will make an offer for less than 100% of the target's shares at one
price and, if successful, will use its controlling interest to "freezeout," see note 52 infra, the
remaining shareholders at a lower price. This is a powerful acquisition technique because it
pressures target shareholders to tender in the first step or risk being frozen out at the lower price
in the second step. See Bradney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HARV. L. REv. 297, 337 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fair Shares]; Bradney & Chirelstein, A
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 81 YALE L.J. 1354, 1361-62 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Restatement]; Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Cu"ent Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 676-93 (1984); Comment, supra note 48, at 403-13. The Maryland
statute prohibits a lower second step price, effectively eliminating the front-end loaded tender
offer. See note 141 infra and accompanying text.
50. DEPARTMENT OF LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE, STAFF REPORT TO THE GENERAL AssEM·
BLY OF MARYLAND, Extraordinary Session, June 1983, at 14 (1983) (intent of Maryland statute
is to protect target shareholders in the second step of a takeover) [hereinafter cited as STAFF
REPORT].
S 1. Fundamental changes in corporate structure, such as mergers or sales of corporate assets,
must ordinarily be approved by both the target's board of directors and its shareholders. See,
e.g., DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983) (requiring majority vote of shareholders); N.Y. Bus.
CoRP. LAW§ 903 (McKinney Supp. 1984) (requiring 2/3 vote of shareholders). However, if the
ownership of the rest of the corporate stock is scattered or isolated a tender ofl'eror may be able
to control corporate affairs with significantly less than a majority interest and thus affect the
merger or sale of assets.
In the rare case where a tender offerer acquires 90% to 95% of the target's stock, it may
utilize the short-form merger procedure available in many states to effect a merger without shareholder approval. See, e.g., DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1983) (requiring 90% control of the
corporation's shares); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW§ 905 (McKinney Supp. 1984) (requiring 90%).
Short form merger statutes are designed to give force to the will of a dominant majority of
shareholders in the face of a recalcitrant or hostile minority. See Note, The Short Merger Statute,
32 U. Cm. L. REv. 596, 598 (1965).
52. In its strictest sense, a freezeout involves action taken by the controlling shareholders of a
corporation solely for the purpose of terminating minority shareholders' equity interest in the
enterprise. See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 11
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1964);see also Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977)
(holding that a cause of action by minority shareholders exists in the event of a freezeout even if
the majority's actions meet the letter of the law); but see also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 715 (Del. 1983) (severely limiting the scope and effect of Singer).
In the traditional case of a merger approved by the board of directors and at least a majority
of the shareholders of two independent corporations dealing at arm's length, the controlling and
minority shareholders receive identical treatment. The terms of the merger, approved by a majority of stockholders of each corporation, apply equally to all. Freezeout mergers differ in that
the acquiring corporation is also the contrt>lling shareholder of the target. The acquiring corporation can cause the target to be merged into it and "freezeout" the remaining target shareholders by providing in the merger plan that each target share be traded for cash. The acquiring
corporation can then use its controlling interest in the target to carry out the merger plan. For a
concise description of the difference between arm's length mergers and freezeout mergers, see
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than the premium price initially offered by the tender offeror in order
to gain its controlling interest. 53
The Maryland statute attempts to protect minority target shareholders by changing state corporate law voting requirements for certain major corporate transactions and by adding provisions governing
the rights of objecting stockholders. Any business combination54 must ~
be recommended by the target company's Board of Directors and approved by at least eighty percent of the outstanding shares eligible to
vote and at least two-thirds of the voting shares not owned by the
interested stockholder55 or its affiliates. 56 This means that a business
combination such as a merger must be approved by a "supermajority"
of the target company's shareholders.
The stated purpose of Maryland's supermajority voting requirement is to give weight to minority interests in the governance of major
corporate affairs. 57 However, in order to prevent a tyranny of the minority, the Maryland law provides for an exemption to the
supermajority requirement commonly called a fair price provision. A
supermajority vote does not apply if the cash or other consideration
(e.g., securities) received by minority shareholders in a business combination is at least equal in value to the highest figure yielded by a complicated statutory formula. 58 Thus, a tender offeror may freezeout the
minority if it is willing to abide by the fair price provision. In this
way, the Maryland approach seeks to balance the interests of controlling and dissenting shareholders after a successful tender offer.
The voting restrictions and fair price provision of the new Maryland statute are similar to those found in recent shareholder-adopted
Restatement, supra note 49, at 1357-58; Greene, Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487, 488-90 (1976).
Some commentators would use the term freezeout even when target shareholders are not
forced to give up their equity if the consideration they receive is inadequate. The emphasis is
placed not on the cashing out of the target shareholders, but on the controlling shareholder's
ability to set the merger terms to its advantage. See Greene, supra, at 489 n.8; Toms, supra note
48, at 548, n.2.
53. STAFF REPORT, supra note 50, at 9.
54. "Business Combination" is defined broadly in the Maryland statute. See Mo. CoRPS. &
AssNS. CooE ANN. § 3-601(e) (Supp. 1984).
55. Section 3-601(j) of the Maryland statute provides:
"Interested Stockholder" means any person (other than the corporation or any subsidiary)
that:
(1) (i) Is the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of 10 percent or more of the voting
power of the outstanding voting stock of the corporation; or
(ii) Is an affiliate of the corporation and at any time within the 2 year period immediately prior to the date in question was the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of 10
percent or more of the voting power of the then outstanding voting stock of the corporation.
MD. CoRPS. & AssNS. CoDE ANN. § 3-60l(j) (Supp. 1984).
56. MD. CORPS. & AssNS. CoDE ANN. § 3-602 (Supp. 1984).
57. STAFF REPORT, supra note 50, at 15.
58. Section 3-603(b) of the Maryland statute entitles holders of common stock of the target
to the highest of the following figures:
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corporate charter amendments. 59 As shareholder-adopted corporate
charter amendments, these provisions may be permissible. 60 The essential issue is whether a state can constitutionally impose these
"shark-repellent amendments" on all corporate domic~:aries in the
name of investor protection. 6t
''
In addition to providing protection against hostile t~keover bids,
the Maryland statute grants the Board of Directors of a target company wide discretion to define various combinations it wishes to exclude from coverage under the new law. 62 This "ftjendly offer"
exemption was necessary to gain support for the statute from the business community. 63 But, the exemption, supermajority, and fair price
provisions of the Maryland statute present problems similar to those
found in first generation statutes. The. Maryland approach may impermissibly burden interstate commerce and interfere with the principles
of investor autonomy and neutrality in the Williams Act.
(1) Highest price per share (including brokerage commissions and transfer taxes) paid
by the interested shareholder for any target shares acquired by it for the two year period
prior to the first general public announcement of the proposed business combination.
(2) Highest price per share paid by the interested stockholder in the transaction in
which it became an interested stockholder.
(3) Market value of target shares on the day of the first general public announcement of
the proposed business combination.
,
(4) Market value of target shares on the day on which the interested stockholder first
became an interested stockholder.
(5) The figure arrived at through formula (3) multiplied by the fraction of the highest
price per share paid by the interested stockholder for target shares for the period two years
before the first general public announcement of the proposed business combination over the
market value of target shares on the first day in that two year period that the interested
stockholder acquired target shares.
(6) The figure arrived at through formula (4) multiplied by the fraction described in
formula (5).
Note that in formulas (5) & (6) the fraction will be greater than one unless the highest
price paid for target shares is equal to first day price.
See MD. CoRPS. & AssNs. CoDE ANN.§ 3-603(b) (Supp. 1984).
59. See, e.g.• FOSTER WHEELER CoRP., PROXY STATEMENT (Mar. 18, 1983), reprinted in 2
A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, REsPONSES, AND PLANNING, 693-705 (1983).
60. The charter amendments are permissible under state enabling Jaws. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 616(a)(2) (McKinney 1963). But see
notes 184-85 infra and accompanying text.
With respect to corporate charter amendments adopted by shareholder vote, the SEC re·
quires extensive disclosure of the amendments' potential harm to investors' interests and their
tendency to benefit management in a takeover contest. See Disclosure in Proxy and Information
Statements; Anti-Takeover or Similar Proposals, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,230,
[1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 81,748 (Oct. 13, 1918).
61. See notes 183-91 infra and accompanying text.
62. MD. CoRPS. & AssNS. CoDB ANN. § 3-603(c)(l) (Supp. 1984).
63. See note 181 infra. Another statutory exemption deserves special attention. Business
combinations involving targets that, prior to July l, 1983, already had a shareholder with a 10%
or greater beneficial interest in the company are exempted. MD. CoRPS. & AssNs. CODE ANN.
§ 3-603(d)(l) (Supp. 1984).
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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FIRST GENERATION STATE
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION

The cons4-;tutionality of first generation state takeover statutes has
been challenged on two grounds. Opponents of the statutes claim that
such regulation violates the commerce clause and that the Williams
Act preempts state regulation of nationwide tender offers under the
supremacy cl~use. 64
This Part'.examines the validity of these constitutional objections.
First, this Pa.ft: delineates the commerce clause analysis of first generation state tak~over statutes that provided the basis for the opinion of
the Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp. Next, this Part reviews the arguments for and against preemption, and suggests guidelines for determining when state tender offer legislation defeats congressional
purposes and should therefore be preempted. This Part concludes that
state regulation is not always inconsistent with congressional objectives in the Williams Act but that the states may play only a limited
regulatory role.
A.

Commerce Clause

The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have Power
. [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." 65 The
individual states, however, are not altogether excluded from exercising
regulatory power that has an effect on interstate commerce. 66 Under
the Pike test, 67 "[a] state statute must be upheld if it 'regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental . . . unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.' " 68 In MITE, Justice White, writing for a plurality,
found that the Illinois Act violated this test for two reasons. First, the
64. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 34; Moylan, supra note 38; Wilner & Landy, supra note
34; Note, supra note 34. But see, e.g., Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look
at the Theoretical Underpinnings a/Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733 (1979);
Sargent, supra note 2; Shipman, supra note 38; Note, Response to Great Western, supra note 3;
Note, supra note 35.
65. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
66. See Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980).
67. Pike v. Bruce C:hurch, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
68. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 640 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970)). "Evenhandedness" here means that a state's regulatory scheme must not
further residents' interests at the expense of the interests of residents in other states. If the statute is characterized as investor protection legislation, it would appear that the statutes regulate
evenhandedly since they pertain equally to transactions involving both resident and nonresident
shareholders. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 721. If state takeover legislation is viewed as an
attempt to shield target management for the purpose of keeping corporations within the state, its
constitutionality under the commerce clause is open to greater challenge. See Shipman, supra
note 38, at 745-46; Note, supra note 35, at 528. But see Edgar v. MITE, Corp., 457 U.S. at 64647 (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that states may have a legitimate interest in protecting instate corporations from takeover).
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Illinois Act produced direct rather than incidentat restraints on interstate commerce. Second, the burden the Illinois Act imposed on interstate commerce was excessive in light of the local interests the Act
purported to further.
1. Direct Restraints on Interstate Commerce

The extraterritorial reach of state takeover legislation has proven
to be a fatal constitutional defect. 69 Unlike blue sky laws, which regulate securities transactions occurring within a particular state and only
incidentally affect interstate commerce, 70 most first generation state
takeover legislation directly regulates securities transactions that take
place across state lines. 71 Such direct regulation is prohibited by the
commerce clause. 72
The Illinois statute at issue in MITE reached transactions occurring wholly outside of the state. 73 Analogizing the limits of state legislative power to the jurisdictional limits of state courts, Justice White
wrote that a state's direct assertion of " 'extraterritorial jurisdiction
over persons or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the State's power.' " 74
69. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641-43 (1982); Great Western United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1286 (5th Cir. 1978), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great
Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); see also DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 38, at 231;
Wilner & Landy, supra note 34, at 19-21; Note, supra note 34, at 1153; Note, supra note 35, at
527-28. But see Shipman, supra note 38, at 740-55 (discussing the validity of the extraterritorial
reach of state statutes). Even those state statutes that apply only to tender offers made for instate targets have been held unconstitutional on commerce clause grounds. See Dart Indus. v.
Conrad, 426 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware statute).
It would seem that first generation state takeover statutes could avoid their unconstitutional
extraterritorial effect by regulating only tender offers made to state residents. But this would
certainly limit the effectiveness of state regulation as tender offerors could simply avoid soliciting
shareholders in states with those statutes. See TENDER OFFERS, supra note 3, at 157. Nevertheless, the new Nebraska Takeover Act has adopted this limited regulatory approach. See CORPO·
RATE TAKEOVER ACT, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2420(4)(b), 21-2427 (1983).
70. The validity of blue sky laws has long been upheld as a function of the state's interest in
protecting resident investors. See, e.g., Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550-51 (1917).
See generally, L. Loss & E. CoWETT, BLUE SKY LAWS 17-42 (1958).
71. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 641 (1982). Even ifthe Illinois statute applied only
to Illinois corporations, the statute would still apply to transactions (i.e., the purchase and sale of
shares) by nonresidents. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 501 (7th Cir. 1980), ajfd. sub
nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); see also Sargent, supra note 2, at 723. The
Supreme Court in MITE also noted that tender offers are communicated through the mail or
other forms of interstate commerce and that shares are tendered through similar means. State
statutes aimed at regulating tender offers directly affect these interstate transactions. 457 U.S. at
641-42.
72. See Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925).
73. 457 U.S. at 642. The Illinois Act could theoretically apply even if no Illinois residents
owned target shares. See note 42 supra.
74. 457 U.S. at 643 (plurality opinion) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)).
Professor Shipman has succinctly discussed the possibility that extraterritorial application of one
state's takeover legislation may prejudice the takeover policies of another state:
Regulation of securities transactions protects investors from profitable as well as unprofitable deals. Determining the optimum level of securities regulation is a relatively delicate,
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2. Indirect Restraint on Interstate Commerce

When a state statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the
question under the Pike test is whether the burden imposed on that
commerce is excessive in relation to the local interests served by the
statute. 75 The most obvious burden first generation state takeover
statutes place on interstate commerce arises from their ability to prevent and delay tender offers anywhere in the country. 76 Allowing a
state to block a nationwide tender offer could have detrimental effects
on investors' interests and the efficiency of markets for corporate acquisition. 77 Other aspects of commerce clause analysis that point toward finding first generation statutes unconstitutional include the
possibility of exposing tender offerors to conflicting state regulatory
schemes, the availability of alternate means of protecting investors
that impose fewer burdens on interstate commerce, and the need for
uniform regulation. 78 On the other hand, proponents of first generation state takeover statutes argue that the statutes further two legitimate local interests: protection of target security holders and
regulation of the internal affairs of companies incorporated under state
albeit unscientific, business. One of the bases on which lines are drawn is that investors may
be harmed by overregulation since regulation decreases the number of buy and sell opportunities presented to them. A state without a takeover statute applicable to domestic corporations may have made an implicit judgment that investors will derive the greatest benefit
from takeover bids absent a level of regulation superadded to the federal statutes and the
various blue sky laws.
Shipman, supra note 38, at 749.
75. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1981) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
76. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643; note 37 supra.
77. According to the MITE Court these effects include: depriving shareholders of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium, inhibiting economic efficiency by hindering the reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use, and reducing incumbent management's
incentive to perform well. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643.
On the economic effects of chilling tender offers, compare Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981);
Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 277
(1984); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market/or Corporate Cantro/, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tux. L. REv. 1 (1978) (arguing that tender offers benefit target
shareholders and that target management should generally not be permitted to take defensive
action), with Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel,
55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1231 (1980) (arguing that the beneficial effects of tender offers are overstated
and that target management should be allowed to exercise its business judgment in deciding
whether to oppose a takeover). For a discussion of the empirical data on the economic effects of
tender offers, see Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983).
78. See Note, supra note 34, at 1160-61. Opponents of state statutes argue that the prospect
of having to comply with the requirements of several state statutes will discourage tender offerors
from making offers and that a uniform system of tender offer regulation must be maintained in
order to minimize disruption of national securities markets. See, e.g., DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 38, at 232-33. But see Sargent, supra note 2, at 728; Note, supra note 35, at 529-30 (suggesting that the burden of compliance with a number of state statutes is not severe given their
similarities).
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law. 79
The MITE Court analyzed the Illinois statute from the perspective
of both of these local interests and found that they failed to outweigh
the burdens imposed on interstate commerce. Looking at the statute as
a form of securities regulation, Justice White wrote that "[w]hile protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State
has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders." 80
The low percentage of resident shareholders necessary to trigger the
jurisdictional provisions of most first generation statutes severely undermines the securities regulation rationale of these statutes.
The Supreme Court was similarly unimpressed with the internal
corporate affairs rationale for the Illinois statute. Proponents of state
takeover statutes argue that because tender offers are related to internal corporate affairs, such as proxy solicitations, which are traditionally regulated under the law of the state of incorporation, tender offers,
too, should be subject to state regulation. 81 The Supreme Court flatly
rejected this view, stating that "[t]ender offers contemplate transfers of
stock by stockholders to a third party and do not themselves implicate
the internal affairs of the target company." 82 Five justices agreed that
the Illinois statute failed the Pike test83 and thus violated the com79. See, e.g., Shipman, supra note 38, at 740-46 (regulation of internal corporate affairs);
Note, supra note 35, at 529 (protection of shareholders); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
at 646 & n. * (Powell, J., concurring) (states have a legitimate interest in keeping corporate head·
quarters within the state); Boehm, supra note 64, at 741-46 (state takeover legislation furthers
additional state interests in regulating foreign corporations doing business within the state and in
preventing precipitous shifts in the location of headquarters of in-state corporations).
80. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 644; see also Note, supra note 35, at 528. Insofar as
the Illinois Act attempted to protect resident investors, the Supreme Court agreed with the court
of appeals that the Illinois disclosure, withdrawal and pro rata provisions afforded only a margi·
nal increase in protection over the Williams Act and current SEC rules. Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. at 645 (agreeing with MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 500 (7th Cir. 1980)), See
also Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th Cir. 1978), revd. on other
grounds sub nom Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (increased disclosure may confuse investors). The MITE courts also believed that any increase in investor protec·
tion afforded by the Illinois Act was offset by the risk that the delay created by the provisions
would deter lucrative tender offers. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 645 (citing MITE Corp. v.
Dixon, 633 F.2d at 500).
81. See Shipman, supra note 38, at 741-45; see also Sargent, supra note 2, at 724-26 (discussing arguments on both sides of this issue). This argument is significant in that it offers a justification for the extraterritorial reach of first generation state takeover statutes: the state of
incorporation has historically regulated corporate matters despite the fact that this may entail
regulation of transactions occurring outside the state. See Boehm, supra note 64, at 743; Shipman, supra note 38, at 742-43. Furthermore, state corporation law is entitled to full faith and
credit in other states. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586
(1947). See generally Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law
and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 CoLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1958). Full faith and credit
would mitigate the critique that tender offerors will be subject to conflicting state statutes.
Courts could apply the takeover law of the state in which the target was incorporated.
82. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 645; see also Wilner & Landy, supra note 34, at 16-17;
Note, supra note 34, at 1153-55 (suggesting that a tender offer does not implicate corporate
internal affairs but is merely the aggregate of numerous individual sales of securities).
83. Justice Powell joined this part of the opinion of the court because its reasoning "leaves
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merce clause.
B. Preemption

States are preempted from regulating areas in which Congress is
competent to legislate if any one of four tests is met. 84 The preemption
debate surrounding state takeover regulation has focused on the question of whether state regulation frustrates congressional objectives in
the Williams Act in some substantial way. 85 Under this test, courts
,and commentators have attempted to define Congress' intent in passing the Williams Act. There is general agreement that Congress was
concerned with protecting investors. 86 What is not clear, however, is
the meaning of investor protection.

1. The Argument for Preemption: The Market Approach to Investor
Protection
According to the Fifth Circuit in Great Western United Corp. v.
some room for state regulation of tender offers." Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646 (Powell,
J., concurring). Thus, while Justice Powell agreed that the balance of burdens on interstate
commerce and local benefits indicated that the Illinois statute violated the commerce clause, he
would not necessarily bar less offensive state regulation.
84. The four tests, any of which will lead to a finding of preemption are: (1) Express congressional intent to exclude state regulation. See, e.g., Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218 (1947) (Federal Warehouse Act expressly preempts all concurrent legislation). (2) Congressional intent to exclude state regulation implied by the pervasive scheme of federal regulation.
See, e.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (pervasive scheme of federal
aircraft noise regulation suggests preemption of state law); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,
315 U.S. 148 (1942) (pervasive scheme of federal regulation of renovated butter preempts state
regulation). (3) Direct conflict between federal and state regulatory schemes so that compliance
with both is physically impossible. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963) (discussing hypothetical physical impossibility and citing relevant cases). (4)
State regulation that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (state alien
registration acts preempted).
85. Most courts and commentators agree that in passing the Williams Act, Congress did not
explicitly or implicitly prohibit states from regulating tender offers. See Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982); see also Sargent, supra note 2, at 704-06; Shipman, supra note 38, at
756-58; Note, supra note 35, at 519-20. But see Wilner & Landy, supra note 34, at 25; Note,
supra note 34, at 1164-66.
In most cases it is possible for an offeror to comply with both state and federal tender offer
regulation. However, the SEC has attempted to provoke a direct conflict between federal regulations and state precommencement notification provisions by adopting Rule 14d-2(b) requiring
that a tender offeror make its offer effective within five days of publicly announcing the material
terms of the offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984). The SEC, in acknowledging this "direct and
substantial" conflict, explained that Rule 14d-2(b) was "necessary for the protection of investors
and to achieve the purpose of the Williams Act." Tender Offers, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,373, at 82,584 (Dec. 19, 1979). The commission believed that "the
state takeover statutes .•. frustrate[d] the operation and purposes of the Williams Act." Id. For
a discussion of the conflict between state precommencement notification provisions and Rule
14d-2(b) and a look at state attempts to avoid preemption, see Sargent, supra note 2, at 707-12.
86. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. I, 26-37 (1977).
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Kidwell, 87 Congress, in the Williams Act, "relied on a 'market approach' to investor protection." 88 The court stated that Congress recognized that tender offers often benefit individual investors89 and thus
Congress advocated a narrow regulatory role in the tender offer area.
Congress realized, howev~r, that laissez-faire is inconsistent with investors' interests. To counteract the speed and secrecy of the unregulated tender offer, the Williams Act attempts to insure that investors
are provided with enough time and information to decide whether to
tender their shares,90 while at the same time leaving investors the opportunity to receive attractive tender offers. Individual investors, not
a governmental "benevolent bureaucracy," 91 or a fiduciary target
management, 92 should decide whether a tender offer succeeds or fails.
However, in order to protect the investor's decision-making ability
from bias, Congress had to avoid giving an advantage to either the
tender offeror or to target management. 93 Neutrality between offerors
and management thus becomes the essence of investor protection.
State takeover regulation presents two related obstacles to the Williams Act's market approach to investment protection. First, state regulation may rely on a benevolent bureaucracy or target management's
fiduciary duties to protect investors. The Williams Act emphasizes
investor autonomy. Second, state regulation may disrupt the neutral
balance the Williams Act established between tender offerors and target management. By putting tender offerors and target management
on equal footing, Congress intended to leave investors free to make
informed, unbiased decisions regarding takeover bids. The preemption test used by those courts that view the Williams Act as adopting a
market approach is whether the state regulation upsets that neutral
balance. 94 Justice White argued in MITE that pre-commencement no87. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
88. 577 F.2d at 1276.
89. 577 F.2d at 1277.
90. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
91. In MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980), ajfd. sub nom. Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), the Seventh Circuit in examining an administrative hearing
provision characterized "Illinois' substitution of [its] judgment •.. for an investor's own assessment of the equitability of a tender offer" as a "benevolent bureaucracy." 633 F.2d at 494.
"[T]his approach to investor protection • . . is preempted by the • . . Williams Act, which contemplates unfettered choice by well-informed investors." 633 F.2d at 494.
92. The Fifth Circuit described the "fiduciary approach" of state takeover statutes as "[reliance] upon the business judgment of corporate directors with a fiduciary duty to their shareholders" to protect investors instead of letting investors bargain for themselves. 577 F.2d at 1279.
"[T]he market approach to investor protection adopted by Congress and the fiduciary approach
. . . are incompatible." 577 F.2d at 1279.
93. See Edgar v. MITE Corp, 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982) ("[A] major aspect of the effort to
protect the investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder."); see also
note 25 supra.
94. Kidwell, 571 F.2d at 1279-80 ("Idaho disrupted the neutrality indispensable for the
proper operation of the federal market approach to tender offer regulation. The • • • statute
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tifi.cation, 95 administrative hearing96 and fairness provisions97 favored
target management and reduced investor autonomy in derogation of
congressional design. Thus, according to Justice White, the Illinois
statute was preempted by the Williams Act.
2.

The Argument Against Preemption: Investor Protection Through
Additional Regulation

Those who support state takeover regulation, like those who oppose it, emphasize the investor protection goals of the Williams Act.
,They reject, however, the proposition that Congress intended to adopt
a particular method to achieve this goal. 98 Under this view, the "market approach's" neutral balance between tender o:fferors and target
management does not represent a congressional objective, but is
merely an incident of the Williams Act's disclosure policies.99 In support of this view, proponents of state takeover legislation cite the legislative hearings on the Williams Act 100 and the Supreme Court's
discussion of the Act's legislative history in Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industries. 101
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives' of
the Williams Act.") (footnotes omitted); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 635.
95. "[B]y providing the target company with additional time within which to take steps to
combat the offer, the preco=encement notification provisions furnish incumbent management
with a powerful tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the stockholders.
• • •" MITE, 451 U.S. at 635.
96. ''The potential for delay provided by the hearing procedures upset the balance struck by
Congress by favoring management at the expense of stockholders." 457 U.S. at 639.
97. "[T]he state thus offers investor protection at the expense of investor autonomy - an
approach quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress." 457 U.S. at 640 (quoting 633 F.2d at
494).
98. See Boehm, supra note 64, at 750; Sargent, supra note 2, at 714-15; Shipman, supra note
38, at 759.
99. In the words of one student co=entator, "Any balance that emerged from the Williams
Act was neither a 'purpose' nor an 'objective' of its draftsmen, but rather a byproduct of the
congressional desire to 'require full and fair disclosure.' " Note, supra note 35, at 522; see also
Boehm, supra note 64, at 747.
100. In an often quoted remark, SEC Chairman Cohen stated, "The principal point is that we
are not concerned with assisting or hurting either side. We are concerned with the investor who
today is just a pawn in a form of industrial warfare. . . . The investor is lost somewhere in the
shuflle. This is our concern and our only concern." Full Disclosure of Corp. Equity Ownership and
in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Cu"ency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1967), quoted in Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1977) (emphasis supplied by the court).
101. 430 U.S. 1 (1977). The Piper Court stated, "Neutrality is . . . but one characteristic of
legislation directed toward a different purpose-the protection of investors." 430 U.S. at 29.
The proponents' reliance on Piper is to some extent misplaced. The issue before the court in
that case was whether the Williams Act confers a private right of action upon defeated tender
offerors. The Court held that Congress intended to protect investors, not tender offerors, in the
Williams Act. The Court did not discuss whether the Williams Act embodies a neutral regulatory approach to tender offers with which the states could not interfere. See Crane Co. v. Lam,
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1J 97,896 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 1981) (holding a
Pennsylvania law preempted by the Williams Act because it gave target management advantages
not contemplated by Congress).
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The proponents of state takeover regulation further contend that
state statutory provisions such as those for pre-commencement notification are consistent with the goal of investor protection because they
reduce the pressure on shareholders to tender immediately and mitigate the panic atmosphere surrounding a tender offer. 102 Indeed some
commentators argue that state statutes realize the goals that the Williams Act was designed, but failed, to achieve. 103 The fact that state
regulation may also create delay, which may help target management
defeat a tender offer, does not in their view create a basis for preemption.104 Proponents of state regulatory efforts argue that Congress
wanted to protect investors; it did not intend to confer upon tender
offerors a right to make an unfettered offer.
3. A Suggested View of the Williams Act

This subsection argues that the correct view of the Williams Act
lies close to the "market approach" view. The "market approach"
view recognizes the interrelatedness of neutrality and the Williams
Act's concept of investor protection. The legislative history of the Act
indicates that Congress believed that a neutral balance between tender
offerors and target management would benefit investors by preserving
their opportunity to receive attractive tender offers and by providing a
check on inefficient management. 105 Thus, contrary to the opinion of
some proponents of state takeover legislation, neutrality and investor
protection are integrated principles.106
There is, however, a tendency under the "market approach" view
to overemphasize the purposefulness with which Congress adopted a
neutral regulatory stance in the Williams Act. The legislative history
reveals that Congress adopted a neutral stance not simply because
102. See, e.g., Sargent, supra note 2, at 716-20; Note, Response to Great Western, supra note
3, at 913, 915; Note, supra note 35, at 524.
103. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 719; Note, Response to Great Western, supra note 3, at 915.
104. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 715-16; Note, supra note 35, at 524-25.
105. The following exchange between Senator Javits and Senator Williams, the sponsor of
the Williams Act, illustrates congressional concern over tender offer regulation:
Mr. JAVITS. One other question I should like to ask the Senator: There is no intendment in the measure • . . to in any way condemn the practice of making tenders, is there?
Sometimes stockholders do very well because of tenders, especially competitive tenders.
Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. There is no intention in any way to prohibit tender
offers. As a matter of fact, I think it [the Williams Act] might encourage them.
113 CoNG. REc. 24,665 (1967). See also 113 CoNG. REc. 854 (1967) (In his remarks before the
Senate, Senator Williams stated that "[the Williams Act] is not aimed at obstructing legitimate
takeover bids. In some instances, a change in management will prove a welcome boon for shareholder and employee . . • .").
106. Congress recognized that the pro-management bias of the early versions of the Williams
Act was detrimental to investors' interests in receiving lucrative tender offers. See Piper, 430
U.S. at 30. Thus, to a large extent, Congress perceived neutrality and investor protection as
integrated principles. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1980}, ajfd. sub
nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982} ("[A]n equitable balance between the contending sides is perceived as a principal means of investor protection.").
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neutrality preserves investors' opportunities to receive tender offers,
but in part because it was unsure of what type and degree ofregulation
would best serve investors' interests. 107 Given this uncertainty, it is
incorrect to speak of the Williams Act as establishing an immutable
congressional balance.
Although the argument against the "market approach" is useful in
that it questions the purposefulness of the neutral balance in the Williams Act, 108 the argument often goes too far. The Williams Act does
affirmatively recognize neutrality as an element of investor protection.109 This is made explicit in the congressional debates and is implicit in the reformulation of the pro-management bias of the original
version of the Williams Act. 11 Furthermore, discussion of the Williams Act in Congress subsequent to its passage suggests that Congress
has embraced the courts' "market approach" interpretation of the
Act.1 11 Thus, even if Congress initially adopted a neutral stance for

°

107. The legislative history reveals that there was great disagreement over the desirability of
facilitating or hindering the tender offer process. While some tender offers proved lucrative to
investors and the national economy, others provided a vehicle with which self-interested outsiders could "raid" a target. In view of this lack of consensus on tender offer policy, Congress
determined to "avoid tipping the balance of regulation." See S. REP. No. 550, supra note 15, at
3; H.R. REP. No. 1711 at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS, at 2813, supra
note 15; 113 CoNG. REc. 24,664 (1967). This language, often used to support the market approach view of the act, see note 25 supra, may in fact be interpreted to support the opposite view.
The passive tone of "avoid tipping" may suggest that Congress did not intend to establish a
neutral balance between tender offerors and target management, but rather opted for neutrality
due to an inability to reconcile incompatible economic philosophies on how best to protect investors in the tender offer context. See Boehm, supra note 64, at 749-50; Note, supra note 35, at 522
n.81.
108. Proponents of state takeover legislation emphasize Congress' uncertainty about the
proper role and strength of federal regulation. See Boehm, supra note 64, at 749-50; Shipman,
supra note 38, at 759-60. When such uncertainty exists it is appropriate to allow states to perform their Brandeisian laboratory functions. See Shipman, supra note 38, at 760. States should
therefore be left free to experiment in order to find the best method for protecting investors. One
commentator has suggested: "If a scheme of state regulation does not eliminate 'the basic capability of offerors to make successful tender offers' and if the scheme is in fact designed to protect
investors . . • then there would seem to be little basis for objection." Sargent, supra note 2, at
715 (quoting MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1980), affd. sub nom. Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982)).
However, even if one accepts that Congress did not establish an immutable balance in the
Williams Act, one may still reject the states' role in altering the balance. See Great Western
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1280 n.52 ("Changing economic conditions may have disrupted the balance that Congress struck in the Williams Act. But, it is for Congress - not Idaho
- to determine if adjustments in the federal balance are necessary, and if so, what adjustments
should be made."), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443
U.S. 173 (1979). The national market for corporate acquisition may not be an appropriate area
for individual states to perform their Brandeisian laboratory functions.
109. A commentator sympathetic to state efforts in the takeover area stated that "[i]t is difficult to describe the Williams Act's policy of investor protection through full and fair disclosure
without reference to regulatory neutrali~y, and the Piper language, when considered in context,
does not support a contrary view." Sargent, supra note 2, at 714.
110. See note 107 supra.
111. During consideration of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976), Congress specifically addressed the ten-day proration period of the Wil-
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mixed reasons, the theory that Congress adopted neutrality because it
promotes investors' interests now predominates. Congressional acquiesence in this judicially accepted view of the Williams Act merits
recognition.
Accepting the importance of neutrality in federal tender offer legislation means that the states may play only a narrow regulatory role.
While the Williams Act does not reflect an immutable balance between tender offerors and target management it does suggest that the
balance is an important aspect of the Act's goal of investor protection.
In short, states may, to a limited extent, depart from the neutral regulatory balance of the Williams Act in search of better ways of protecting investors' interests; however, states may not depart in a manner
that is likely to decrease significantly investors' opportunities to receive tender offers for their shares. This is the preemption standard
against which the Maryland legislation should be judged.
Ill.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MARYLAND APPROACH

This Part analyzes the Maryland statute in terms of the commerce
clause and preemption challenges that led to the invalidation of first
generation statutes. While states have a legitimate interest in protecting investors in potential freezeout situations, state regulation must be
consistent with congressional objectives in federal tender offer legislation and must not overburden interstate markets for corporate
acquisition.
The Maryland statute, like first generation legislation, is subject to
commerce clause attack; however, the case for invalidation on commerce clause grounds is less compelling here than in the context of
first generation statutes. By concentrating on the second step of the
takeover process and limiting jurisdiction to corporate domiciliaries,
the Maryland legislation cuts back on the extraterritorial reach that
Iiams Act. The House Report and comments by Congressman Rodino reaffirm the importance
of neutrality in the federal regulatory scheme.
The House Report stated:
[I]t is clear that this short waiting period was founded on congressional concern that a
longer delay might unduly favor the target firm's incumbent management, and permit them
to frustrate many pro-competitive cash tenders. This ten day waiting period thus underscores the basic purpose of the Williams Act - to maintain a neutral policy towards cash
tender offers, by avoiding lengthy delays that might discourage their chances for success.
H.R. REP. No. 1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12; reprinted in 1976 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS
2572, 2644 (emphasis added).
Congressman Rodino explained to the House:
Lengthier delays will give the target firm plenty of time to defeat the offer • . • • And the
longer the waiting period, the more the target's stock may be bid up in the market, making
the offer more costly and less successful. Should this happen, it will mean that shareholders
of the target firm will be effectively deprived of the choice that cash tender offers give to
them • . • . Generally, the courts have construed the Williams Act so as to maintain • • •
options for the target company's shareholders, and the House conferees contemplate that the
courts will continue to do so.
122 CoNG. REc. 30,877 (1976) (emphasis added).
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proved fatal to first generation statutes. But even if the Maryland statute is not clearly invalid under the commerce clause it fails on the
preemption grounds left open in MITE. The regulation is likely to
upset the balance between tender offerors and target management in a
manner that threatens to decrease significantly investors' opportunities
to receive tender offers. It therefore interferes with congressional
objectives in the Williams Act.

Commerce Clause
The Maryland statute successfully avoids placing impermissible direct restraints on interstate commerce. It does not put conditions on
tender offers communicated across state lines, but focuses primarily on
the internal corporate affairs of companies incorporated within the
state. Consequently, the Maryland statute's effect on interstate commerce is less direct than that typical of first generation statutes, 112 particularly of the statute at issue in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 113
Furthermore, because the Maryland statute is part of the state corporation law, it will receive full faith and credit from other states. 114 The
Maryland approach thus avoids the problem of exposing tender offerors to conflicting state statutes.
However, even if the statute avoids direct restraints on interstate
commerce, it may impose indirect restraints that outweigh the local
interests served by the statute. Moreover, to the extent that a court
views Maryland's professed rationale for its statute as a veil for promoting parochial state interests, the legitimacy of the statute will be
undercut. Finally, even if the Maryland statute furthers legitimate
state interests, the statute may be struck down on the ground that
those interests may be adequately served by alternate means that impose fewer burdens on interstate commerce.
In shifting the regulatory focus on takeovers from the first step
(tender offers) to the second step (business combinations) the Maryland legislature intended to avoid characterization of the statute as a
species of securities regulation 115 and to improve the statute's chances
of passing the Pike test for indirect restraints on commerce. Unlike
first generation statutes that place explicit conditions on transfers of
A.

112. See notes 69-74 supra and accompanying text.
113. It is true that the Maryland approach affects business combinations of large, publicly
held corporations, which generate interstate transactions. Nevertheless, by focusing on the internal affairs of these corporations, the Maryland statute avoids the problems of extraterritorial
reach which troubled the Court in MITE. See notes 73-74 supra and accompanying text; see also
STAFF REPORT, supra note 50, at 69.
114. See Shipman, supra note 38, at 742 n.124; note 81 supra.
115. To the extent that a state statute is a form of securities regulation, it is clear that the
state interest in regulation is limited to protection of resident investors. Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). The Maryland statute applies to corporate domiciliaries regardless of
the number of resident shareholders. Hence the statute has little to co=end it as a valid form
of securities regulation. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
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stock by target shareholders to the tender offeror, the Maryland statute "implicate[s] the internal affairs of a target company," 116 and so is
related to traditional forms of state corporation law.
The Maryland statute's status as state corporation law offers support against commerce clause attack. The law of the state of incorporation has historically regulated corporate internal affairs despite the
fact that this may mean regulation of transactions occurring outside
the state. 117 The state of incorporation also plays a legitimate role in
protecting resident and nonresident corporate shareholders under
state fiduciary doctrines. 118 Arguably, the Maryland statute protects
investors by insuring them a fair freezeout price. This may appear to
be a more tangible benefit than the extra time and disclosure benefits
of first generation statutes.119
But Maryland's interest in regulating corporate internal affairs and
- protecting investors may not offset the burdens its statute places on
interstate commerce. Unlike first generation statutes, the Maryland
legislation does not obstruct interstate commerce by blocking nationwide tender offers. However, it burdens commerce by increasing the
costs of corporate takeovers. 12° Corporate takeovers may be desirable
from the standpoint of interstate commerce because they serve as a
discipline on inefficient management. Business combinations after a
takeover may improve resource allocation and produce economies of
scale. 121 The MITE Court emphasized that these salutary effects are
negated by anti-takeover legislation.122
Another burden produced by the Maryland statute concerns its
potential interference with the accuracy of markets for corporate acquisition. It may increase takeover costs for reasons irrelevant to the
target company's value by artificially tying freezeout price to tender
offer price whatever the vicissitudes of the market. 123 The value of a
target, as reflected in its share and asset value, may drop in the time
116. See note 82supra and accompanying text. But see notes 143-49 infra and accompanying
text (Maryland statute reaches arm's length transactions more akin to tender offers than corporate internal affairs).
117. See Boehm, supra note 64, at 743; see also Shipman, supra note 38, at 742-43.
118. Boehm, supra note 68, at 743. However, it is not clear that state fiduciary doctrines are
applicable in all corporate takeover contexts. The two-tier offer (tender offer and freezeout
merger in a short period of time) may be regarded as an arm's length transaction between the
tender offeror and target shareholders. The shareholders may not need the protection of state
fiduciary law. See notes 146-48 infra and accompanying text. Indeed, the application of state
fiduciary law in the context of two-tier tender offers may conflict with the market approach of the
Williams Act. See note 182 infra.
119. But see Toms, supra note 48, at 571 (After a successful tender offer, minority sharehold·
ers may be harmed by a rule tying freezeout price to tender offer price.).
120. See id. at 571-75 (discussing the effect of an equal consideration rule in two-step transac·
tions on corporate acquisition markets). See also notes 175-77 infra and accompanying text.
121. See Toms, supra note 48, at 572 n.83.
122. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643.
123. See Toms, supra note 48, at 571.
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period between a first step tender offer and a planned second step
freezeout. In this situation, under the Maryland fair price provision
the tender offeror will be forced to choose between foregoing_ the
freezeout or paying a freezeout price that is artificially high relative to
the target's value. 124 "The public interest in an accurate market will
be harmed to the extent that the [target] company's assets are being
less accurately valued. . . ."12s
The Maryland approach may also have a chilling effect on tender
offers. Often the object of obtaining control of a target through a
tender offer is to force a business combination. If this objective becomes more expensive as a result of supermajority and fair price provisions, it is reasonable to assume that some people will be deterred from
making tender offers. 126 The Maryland approach is then subject to the
criticism levied at first generation statutes - that shareholders may be
deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. 127
In addition, if the true purpose of the statute is to insulate in-state
corporations at the expense of national markets for corporate acquisition, the commerce clause prohibits the advancement of such parochial interests. 128 A number of commentators have suggested that first
generation statutes are designed to promote economic protectionism.129 The Maryland approach may have a substantial anti-takeover
effect and may be subject to the same economic protectionism claim.
Courts may be reluctant to question a state statute's asserted rationale, but even assuming that the Maryland statute promotes legitimate state interests, the statute may still be declared invalid if there
exist less burdensome means of achieving the desired statutory result.130 If the goal is to protect shareholders from the coercive effects
of two-tier tender offers and freezeout mergers, alternative measures,
such as a new type of appraisal statute, could provide target shareholders with benefits similar to those accorded by the Maryland approach with less disruption of markets for corporate acquisition. 131
Ultimately, the question of the validity of the Maryland approach
124. This assumes that the tender olferor did not obtain a "friendly offer exemption" under
the Maryland statute, see notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text, and that the tender olferor is
unable to command a supermajority vote on a lower freezeout price.
125. Toms, supra note 48, at 573 n.89.
126. Id. at 572; see also notes 167-68 & 175-77 supra and accompanying text.
127. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 633 n.9, 643.
128. See Note, supra note 34, at 1158-59.
129. See note 34 supra.
130. See Note, supra note 34, at 1160-61.
131. Some legal commentators have urged that investors' interests may best be served by
limiting frozen-out shareholders to an appraisal remedy. These commentators add, however,
that to protect investors adequately, appraisal techniques should be revised to take into account
elements of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the freezeout mergei:. See
Toms, supra note 48, at 575-83; Comment, supra note 48, at 418-21. This approach was endorsed
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
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under the commerce clause is less clear than it is for first generation
statutes. Because the new Maryland statute is more closely related to
traditional forms of internal corporate affairs regulation than the Illinois statute struck down in MITE, 132 Maryland may have a stronger
state interest in its statute under the Pike test than the Supreme Court
was willing to accord to the Illinois statute. 133 However, the outcome
of the balancing test is difficult to predict. This lack of clarity on the
commerce clause question is likely to lead a court to reexamine the
issue of when state takeover legislation is preempted by the Williams
Act.
B.

Preemption

Preemption analysis of the Maryland statute must focus on
whether its provisions frustrate congressional objectives in the Williams Act. 134 This analysis is more difficult than preemption analysis
of first generation statutes for two reasons. First, the Maryland statute, unlike first generation state statutes, has a different focus from
that of the Williams Act: it regulates the second step of the takeover
process. 135 Second, because the Maryland statute more closely resembles traditional state corporation law than do first generation statutes,
it would seem to implicate established principles of state fiduciary law
which should not lightly be declared preempted. 136 These factors,
however, should not prevent a court from holding that the Williams
Act preempts the Maryland statute. This Note argues that the
supermajority, fair price and friendly offer exemption provisions of the
Maryland statute are inconsistent with the concept of investor protection embodied in the Williams Act and are unconstitutional under the
supremacy clause.
I.

Federal Regulation of Two-Tier Offers

The Maryland statute focuses on business combinations, the second step of the takeover process; the Williams Act concentrates on
tender offers, the first stage. However, both statutes affect the operation of both stages of a takeover and hence present a possible conflict
of federal and state regulatory objectives.
132. The Supreme Court in MITE noted that the Illinois statute did not qualify as a legitimate form of state securities regulation or as state regulation of internal corporate affairs. Edgar
v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643-44 (1982).
133. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 50, at 70 Qetter of Maryland Attorney General Sachs to
Maryland Governor Hughes).
134. For the various preemption tests, see note 84 supra and accompanying text. There is no
indication in the Williams Act that Congress explicitly or implicitly intended to preempt state
takeover legislation patterned after Maryland law. It is also clear that there is no direct conflict
between the Williams Act and the Maryland General Corporation Law.
135. See notes 137-42 infra and accompanying text.
136. See note 144 infra and accompanying text.
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The Williams Act and SEC rules appear to contemplate and attempt to regulate indirectly two-tier tender offers. Two recent federal
court decisions have upheld the use of "front-end loaded two-tier offers."137 In Rado! v. Thomas 138 the court noted that SEC Rule
13e-3 13 9 "by negative implication, acknowledges that such transactions occur and purports to regulate the second step of such two-tier
transactions." 140
Not only does federal regulation extend to the second tier, but it is
clear that the Maryland statute touches upon the heavily federally regulated first tier. The Maryland approach will greatly affect the tender
offerer's decision on how to structure the first step of a two-tier bid.
Indeed, the new legislation effectively eliminates the possibility of
making a hostile front-end loaded two-tier bid. 141 Most importantly,
by imposing strict conditions on the second step of a takeover, the
Maryland statute may deter potential acquirers from attempting the
first step tender offer. 142 The interrelatedness of the two steps in a
takeover process suggests that while the federal regulatory scheme and
the Maryland approach are hardly congruent, they overlap to a sufficient extent to present the preemption question of whether the Maryland approach stands as an obstacle to the effectuation of
congressional objectives in the tender offer area.
2.

Preemption of State Corporation Law

In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Supreme Court indicated that first
137. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630-31 (D. Md. 1982);
Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1311-13 (S.D. Ohio 1982). For a description of the frontend loaded technique, see note 49 supra.
138. 534 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 (1984).
140. Rado/, 534 F. Supp. at 1312. Rule 13e-3 requires companies to disclose certain information prior to freezing out minority shareholders. The rule exempts from disclosure certain types
of freezeouts that present less opportunity for majority overreaching. Two-tier transactions
(tender offer-merger) are exempted from disclosure if the tender offeror completes the second
step merger within one year of the tender offer and pays frozen-out shareholders the same price
offered during the tender offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(g)(l) (1984). Thus, a front-end loaded bid
(in which tender offer price is higher than merger price) would not be exempted and would have
to comply with the Rule's disclosure requirements.
Ironically, it may benefit a tender offeror not to qualify for the above exemption. If it discloses that the tender offer price will be greater than merger price, the tender offeror may pressure shareholders to tender their shares in the first step. See note 149 infra. However, if the
offeror avoids disclosure and qualifies for the exemption by offering identical tender offer and
freezeout price, shareholders will have little incentive to tender in the first step and the offeror
may fail to gain sufficient control to complete the second step. See Note, Freezeout Merger Regulation: An SEC Rule Joins State Efforts, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 964, 980 n.161 (1980). On
Rule 13e-3 generally, see 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEzEoUTS
§ 9.04[1] (1984).
141. The supermajority and fair price provisions in the Maryland statute insure that in a
business combination opposed by target management target shareholders will not receiv.e less
than tender offer price.
142. See notes 167-68 infra and accompanying text.
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generation state takeover statutes such as the Illinois Act could not be
upheld on the ground that they promote a legitimate state interest in
regulating the internal affairs of corporate domiciliaries. 143 The court
did not accept the premise that tender offers are related to internal
affairs transactions. The new Maryland legislation, however, purports
to concentrate on the second step of the takeover process, often a
freezeout merger. Mergers are classic examples of internal affairs
transactions traditionally regulated under state law. In a freezeout
merger, for example, the actions of the controlling shareholder of a
corporation and their effect on the remaining shareholders may be policed under principles of state fiduciary law. 144 Thus, even ifthere is
tension between federal regulation and the Maryland approach, a
court might be hesitant to declare the Maryland statute preempted by
the Williams Act.14s
This argument for the Maryland approach fails to appreciate that
fiduciary obligations running from the controlling shareholder to the
remaining shareholders vary with the nature of the internal affairs
transaction. Certain types of freezeouts present less opportunity for
controlling shareholders to overreach than do others and hence in
these situations there is less need to defer to state fiduciary law. 146 In
143. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
144. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478-79 (1977) (Freezeout of minority shareholders does not provide a cause of action under § lO(b) of the 1934 Act or SEC Rule lOb-5.),
Santa Fe involved a freezeout under Delaware's "short-form merger" statute. A parent corporation owning 95% of the stock of its subsidiary took advantage of the statute in freezing out the
remaining 5% in a merger. The Supreme Court ruled that such corporate conduct is traditionally left to state regulation. 430 U.S. at 465, 478-79.
145. Cf. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (a factor in determining congressional intent to create a cause of action is whether the cause of action is traditionally relegated to
the states); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 82-85 (1975) (Absent a clear expression of congressional
intent, courts will be reluctant to imply a private cause of action for stockholders from federal
regulation where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.).
146. See Restatement, supra note 49, at 1359-65; Fair Shares, supra note 49, at 336-40;
Greene, supra note 52, at 491-96. These authors contend that freezeouts should be classified
according to their potential for majority overreaching. They would recognize three distinct categories: (1) Two-step (tender offer-merger) transactions between previously unaffiliated corporations, (2) Mergers of long-held affiliates, and (3) Pure going-private transactions.
In the two-step transaction between two unaffiliated corporations, the acquiring corporation
should owe no fiduciary duty to target shareholders if it discloses its plan for the target at the
time of the tender offer and effects those plans soon after assuming control. See Restatement,
supra note 49, at 1361. The transaction is viewed as the result of arm's length bargaining between the acquiring corporation and the target shareholders. Shareholders are able to protect
their own interests with little state intervention. Id. But see note 159 infra.
In the case of mergers oflong-held affiliates there are fiduciary duties running from the parent
to the subsidiary. Contrary to the two-step acquisition in which the parties deal at arm's length,
here the parent has the ability to act on inside information or to time the freezeout to coincide
with its own best interests. See Greene, supra note 52, at 493.
The "going private transaction" presents the greatest opportunity for abuse. Two separate
on-going businesses are not involved. Rather, the controlling shareholders of a corporation simply create a new shell corporation and exchange their stock for stock in the shell corporation.
They then proceed to merge the two corporations and freezeout minority stockholders. The shell
corporation is thus created solely for the purpose of freezing out the minority and giving the
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a merger of long-held affiliates there are important issues concerning
the fiduciary obligations of directors and controlling shareholders, the
business judgment rule and the fairness of the transaction. These issues
have traditiOnally been resolved under state law. In contrast, the
merger associated with the second step of a two-tier tender offer
presents more of an arm's length situation. 147
In the two-tier offer context, the merger is proposed by an outsider,
the tender offeror, at the same time the tender offer is announced. As
an outsider, the tender offerer owes little or no fiduciary obligation to
target shareholders. Moreover, the tender offeror is required at the
outset to disclose its intention to effect a second-step merger. This
required disclosure insures that the second step is based on arm's
length negotiations between the tender offeror and the target shareholders, not upon the tender offeror's use of control if the offer
succeeds. 148
controlling shareholders complete ownership. See Restatement, supra note 49, at 1365; Greene,
supra note 52, at 495-96. For a compilation of recent law review commentary on freezeout and
going-private techniques, see 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 140, at § 9.01 n.6.
147. Some courts, however, have held that fiduciary obligations exist even in the two-tier
offer context. For example, the leading case dealing with minority freezeouts has been Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977), in which the Delaware Supreme Court held that a
tender offeror could not cash out non-tendering target shareholders in a second step merger
without showing that the merger is supported by a valid business purpose. Recently, the Dela·
ware Supreme Court declared that the Singer business purpose test shall no longer have any
effect. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983). The Singer business purpose test
had been criticized by commentators for two reasons. First, the test is based on the theory that a
controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to the minority not to cash them out without a
valid business purpose. This theory was criticized for applying fiduciary principles to a tender
offer that is really an arm's length transaction. See Restatement, supra note 49, at 1362-64; see
also Comment, supra note 48, at 413-16. But see Goldman & Wolfe, In Response to A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 683 (1979). If the tender offeror is
unaffiliated with the target, discloses its intention to freezeout the minority, and effects the freeze·
out shortly after assuming control, it should not owe any fiduciary duty to target shareholders.
See note 146 supra. Second, the business purpose test is unworkable. The distinction between a
purpose designed to benefit the surviving corporation in the merger and one designed to benefit
the controlling shareholder in the target (who is also going to be the owner of the surviving
corporation) is "difficult to perceive." Goldman & Wolfe, supra, at 688; see also Greene, supra
note 52, at 500-02; Greene & Junewicz, supra note 49, at 687. For general commentary on
Singer, see McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny ofMergers, 33 Bus. LAw. 2231
(1978); Note, Singer v. Magnavox Co.: Delaware Imposes Restrictions on Freezeout Mergers, 66
CALIF. L. REV. 118 (1978); Note, Singer v. Magnavox and Cash Take-out Mergers, 64 VA. L.
REv. 1101 (1978); see also Steinberg & Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62
WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1984) (tracing the development of Delaware law from Singer to

Weinberger).
148. Additional insurance would be provided by requiring the tender offeror to complete the
second step soon after the end of th~ offer itself. See Greene, supra note 52, at 509. As the period
between the steps lengthens, the original adversarial nature of the relationship between the tender
offeror and target shareholders is blunted. As the tender offeror uses its controlling interest to
manage the target, the minority may, over time, justifiably come to rely on the tender offeror to
protect its interests. Also, if there is a wide gap between the tender offer and the second step,
there is increased opportunity for self-dealing on the part of the tender offeror-controlling shareholder. SEC rules recognize that a two-tier offer may be characterized as an arm's length transaction only if the second step is completed soon after the tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e3(g)(l) (1984) (exempting two-tier offers from the disclosure provisions of the going-private regu-
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In sum, while state law remains important in regulating most corporate internal affairs transactions, the need for state regulation is
weakest in the context of business combinations associated with twotier tender offers. To the extent that the Maryland approach attempts
to regulate such offers, the internal affairs rationale offers little protection against preemption attack. If indeed two-tier offers represent
arm's length transactions, the disclosure and substantive provisions of
the Williams Act can provide the appropriate means of protecting investors.149 Additional state regulation, such as the Maryland statute,
may unnecessarily upset the Williams Act's balance between tender
offerors and target management and therefore should be preempted.
3.

The Preemption Standard Applied

According to the market approach view of the Williams Act, preemption analysis of state takeover legislation must focus on the extent
to which state legislation upsets the federal regulations' neutral balance between tender offerors and target management, and the concomitant effect on investors' opportunities to receive tender offers. 150 SEC
Rule 14d-8, 151 which has effects similar to those of the fair price provision of the Maryland statute, has been strongly criticized for upsetting
this neutral balance. An even stronger case may be made that the
supermajority, fair price and friendly offer exemption provisions of the
Maryland law will significantly favor target management in the takeover contest. While many states allow shareholders to amend corporate charters to include similar supermajority provisions, 152 Maryland
has imposed these provisions on shareholders of in-state corporations
lations if the second step is made within one year of the tender offer and nontendering sharehold·
ers receive a freezeout price equivalent to the tender offer price); see also note 140 supra.
149. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein argue that while front-end loaded two-tier offers are
arm's length transactions, target shareholders are unable to protect themselves fully. They
assert:
Given the inability of [a target's] dispersed stockholders to communicate with one another
during the tender, the act of offering a higher price on tender than would be paid on merger
would have a "whipsaw" effect on [the] stockholders. Individual stockholders would find it
difficult or impossible to refuse a tender price of $40 when they are also made aware that if
the tender succeeds, the remaining shares will be merged out at $30. In effect, an announced
disparity between the tender and the merger figure would deprive stockholders of their abil·
ity to make unforced, independent judgment on whether an average of $35 is an acceptable
overall price for the assets of the firm.
Fair Shares, supra note 49, at 337.
Brudney & Chirelstein contend that principles of fairness and investor protection dictate that
freezeout price in a two-tier offer be set at the equivalent of tender offer price. They do not
address, however, the preemption and commerce clause questions involved if a state were to
enact their proposals. One student commentator has suggested that the Brudney & Chirelstein
equal-consideration proposal is inconsistent with the federal approach to regulation of two-tier
offers. See Comment, supra note 48, at 404-05, 422.
150. See notes 105-11 supra and accompanying text.
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984).
152. See note 60 supra.
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and thus may be said to have violated the principle of investor autonomy in the Williams Act.
a. The controvery surrounding SEC Rule 14d-8: implications for
the Maryland approach. The recently promulgated SEC Rule 14d-8 153
extends the ten-day proration period provided in the Williams Act. 154
The Williams Act pro rata provision is designed to alleviate some of
the pressure placed on shareholders through the threat of an oversubscribed partial tender offer, by insuring that all shareholders who wish
to receive the tender offer premium can have at least a percentage of
their shares accepted. 155 However, there is still substantial pressure on
target shareholders when the tender offeror announces that its partial
offer is only the first step of a plan to gain complete control and that
the second-step freezeout price will be lower than the partial offer
price.156 Under the Williams Act, if a target shareholder failed to
tender within ten days and if the tender offer were ultimately successful, he might have all of his shares frozen out at the lower second-step
price.
The SEC, through its rule-making power, recently extended the
proration period of the Williams Act to include the entire time the
tender offer remains open: a minimum of twenty business days. According to the SEC, the extended proration period is necessary to protect investors faced with partial and two-tier tender offers. 157 The
SEC has been severely criticized for overstepping its authority in
promulgating this rule. 158 Critics argue that the extension of the proration period is contrary to the explicit ten-day limitation in the Wil153. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984).
154. See note 27 supra.
155. See note 27 supra.
156. In a partial offer with no mention of a second-step freezeout, a target shareholder may
welcome the possible change of corporate control and thus wish to hold on to his or her shares.
If the tender offerer announces its intention to cash out remaining target shareholders in a second step, nontendering shareholders may not be able to benefit from the change in control and
the incentive to tender is increased. But see Green & Junewicz, supra note 49, at 676 (noting that
there may be a great incentive to tender in a partial offer without mention of a second step if
shareholders feel that the tender offerer when in control will run the corporation to its own and
not the shareholders' benefit).
157. See Pro Rata Rule, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 19,336 [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 83,306 (Dec. 15, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Release No.
19,336]; see also Release No. 18,761, supra note 27 (release proposing revised rule 14d-8).
158. Indeed, the rule was adopted over the dissents of SEC Chairman Shad and Commissioner Treadway. Release No. 19,336, supra note 157, at 85,652-54. For detailed commentary in
opposition to the new SEC rule, see Stephenson, Partial Tender Offers: ''Front-End Loaded"
Transactions; Election Procedures in "Cash Election" Mergers. in NEW TECHNIQUES IN ACQUIsmoNS & TAKEOVERS 79, 82-113 (1983) [hereinafter cited as NEW TECHNIQUES]; Note, SEC
Tender Offer Timing Rules: Upsetting A Congressionally Selected Balance, 68 CORNELL L. REv.
914 (1983); Recent Developments, Rulemaking Under Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act: The
SEC Exceeds Its Reach in Attempting to Pull the Plug on Multiple Proration Pools, 36 VAND. L.
REV. 1313 (1983). For commentary in favor of the new rule, see Green, Nathan & Gelford, The
SEC Adopts a More Rational Proration Rule, in NEW TECHNIQUES, supra, at 198; see also
Greene & Junewicz, supra note 49, at 692.
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Iiams Act and upsets its intended neutral balance between tender
offerors and target management by creating delay that will benefit target management. 159
The controversy over the neutrality principle of the Williams Act
and the SEC's authority to alter the balance established by the Act has
important ramifications for the validity of the Maryland statute. By
requiring that second-step price be at least equal to tender-offer price,
the Maryland approach may upset the balance between target management and tender offeror even more radically than an extended proration period. Any incentive to tender early is almost completely eroded
because whether they tender or not, target shareholders receive the
same treatment; they may not be frozen out at lower than tender offer
price. Indeed, the Maryland approach reduces the need for any proration period in a two-tier offer context. 160
The Williams Act pro rata provision and Rule 14d-8 attempt to
insure that all shareholders have an equal opportunity to participate in
the first step of a two-tier bid. 161 The Maryland approach goes beyond
this to give shareholders equal treatment in both stages of a two-step
transaction. 162 If Rule 14d-8 conflicts with the provisions of the Williams Act, then a fortiori the Maryland statute poses an impermissible
conflict.
b. Neutrality violations: supermajority voting, fair price provisions
and friendly offer exemptions. Supermajority provisions make it difficult and expensive to consummate a two-step takeover. 163 Were it not
159. See, e.g., Note, supra note 158, at 936-38; Recent Developments, supra note 158 at 1345·
47. A longer period creates delay because target shareholders have less incentive to tender early.
See note 111 supra.
·
160. The need for a proration period is not completely eliminated because there is still some
risk in not tendering. If for $Orne reason the tender offeror does not complete a second-step and
the market value of the target's share declines, the shareholder will have lost the opportunity to
get a premium for his or her shares. See Toms, supra note 48, at 571. This risk might induce
shareholders to tender in the first step. If this risk were great, enough shareholders might tender
to oversubscribe the offer and trigger the pro rata provision.
161. See Comment, supra note 48, at 404 (1982); see also SEC ADVISORY CoMMITIEE ON
TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (July 8, 1983), reprinted in Special Edition, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1028 (July 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY REPORT]
("There is substantial sentiment on the Committee that, so long as there is equal opportunity for
all shareholders to participate in all phases of each bid, the laws should not distinguish among
various types of bids.").
162. One student commentator has stated, "Equal treatment of shares is a policy restricted in
application to the tendering portion of a two-step acquisition." Comment, supra note 48, at 404
(emphasis in original). The Williams Act's "best price" provision, § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(7) (1982) insures that the highest tender offer price is paid to all tendering shareholders,
even those who tendered before the consideration offered was increased. See note 28 supra.
163. See TENDER OFFERS, supra note 3, at 260-62; 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 59, at 26-30;
1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 140, at § 6.03[2][b]; see also Mullaney, Guarding
Against Takeovers - Defensive Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. LAW. 1441, 1453 (1970). Most state
corporation laws permitting supermajority voting requirements' were directed primarily at the
charters of closely held corporations. The reasoning behind allowing such a requirement preventing oppression of minority shareholders - does not necessarily apply with equal force in
the context of publicly-held corporations. See Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amend-
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for the existence of the fair price provision, Maryland's supermajority
requirement 164 could virtually give management a veto power over
business combinations. 165 Such a pro-management bias runs counter
to the investor protection goal of the neutral stance of the Williams
Act.166

The management-entrenching effect of the supermajority provision
may have a collateral effect in deterring tender offers. 167 Since the
goal of a tender offer is often to gain sufficient control to complete a
takeover, the increased difficulty of achieving this goal may act as a
disincentive to tender offerors. 168 This result may harm investors by
' denying them potential tender offers and the benefits of new
management. 169
The fair price provision in the Maryland statute represents a means
of avoiding the supermajority vote on a business combination. 170
Although at first glance the fair price provision may seem to correct
the disruption of the neutral balance caused by the supermajority voting requirement, 171 the fair price provision itself is inconsistent with
ments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775, 813 (1982);
Johnson, Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses: Business Judgements or Breach ofDuty?, 28 VILL.
L. REV. 51, 72 (1982); see also W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 461 (5th ed. 1980) (Supermajority voting requirements are "normally adopted for the
sole purpose of insuring that incumbent managers will not lose their positions as a result of a
takeover bid."). But see Smith, Fair Price and Redemption Rights: New Dimensions in Defense
Charter Provisions, 4 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1, 10 (1978) (no sound public policy against letting shareholders in publicly held corporations adopt supermajority voting requirements).
164. See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
165. Maryland's state-imposed supermajority provision would seem to have significant management-entrenchment tendencies because a business combination must be approved by a twothirds disinterested shareholder majority. Target management may own enough shares to block
the business combination even if the tender offeror acquires 80% of the total outstanding target
shares. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text; cf. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 49, at
703 n.278 ("The deterrent effect of a 'supermajority' provision is particularly high where management controls enough shares to block the supermajority vote even if the offeror tenders for all
outstanding shares.").
166. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
167. Indeed, a main purpose of shark-repellent provisions is to deter tender offers: ''The idea
is to amend the target's articles of incorporation to make it a less desirable or more difficult
acquisition, and thereby to encourage the 'shark' to seek a more appetizing or more easily digested alternative." Gilson, supra note 163, at 777.
168. Cf. Friedenberg, Jaws Ill: The Impropriety of Shark-Repellent Amendments as a Takeover Defense, 7 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 32, 43, 84, 88 (1982) (supermajority provisions prevent shareholders from accepting offers and also deter bidders); Gilson, supra note 163, at 796-800
(supermajority requirement raises the cost of offers but deterrent effect is attenuated by differing
incentives to offeror and by costs to management of resistance).
169. See note 77 supra and accompanying text; Friedenberg, supra note 168, at 84, 88.
170. See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.
171. Unlike the supermajority requirement, the fair price provision offers little direct advantage to target management. The existence of the provision means that management cannot use its
voting power to block a business combination. See Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers:
Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537, 553-54 (1979). However, requiring tender
offerors to pay "fair price" in the second step may indirectly benefit incumbent management by
increasing the cost of a takeover. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 38, at 196.
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the market approach. Under the market approach view, the Williams
Act requires only that all target shareholders receive an equal opportunity to participate in a tender offer. 172 Those who choose not to tender
presumably make a conscious decision concerning the risks and advantages of holding onto their shares and should not be entitled to the
same treatment as tendering shareholders. Yet the Maryland fair
price provision insures that all target shareholders - tendering and
nontendering - receive similar treatment in the takeover process.173
The fair price provision of the Maryland statute conflicts with the
principles of the Williams Act in other respects. First, the fair price
provision eliminates the capacity of tender offerors to make front-end
loaded two-tier bids, a technique implicitly recognized and permitted
under federal regulations. 174 Second, because target shareholders
know that they cannot be frozen out at less than tender offer price, the
pressure to respond to a tender offer is greatly reduced. 175 As the criticism of SEC Rule 14d-8 has suggested, the reduced pressure on shareholders to respond to a partial or two-tier offer works to the advantage
of target management. 176 Management gains more time to block a
tender offer while tender offerors are likely to have to incur greater
expense to succeed. This is likely to cut down on the willingness of
people to make tender offers, 177 an effect inconsistent with the concept
of investor protection in the Williams Act. Finally, the mechanics of
Maryland's fair price provision are such that the tender offeror will
have great difficulty ascertaining the cost of the second step of a takeover.178 This makes the first step, the tender offer, less attractive,
again disrupting the balance of the federal statute.
The Maryland statute also disrupts the balance between tender offerors and target management by granting target management discretion to exclude certain business combinations from the coverage of the
Iaw. 179 Many courts and commentators analyzing the friendly offer
exemptions of first generation state takeover statutes have found that
such exemptions tip the regulatory balance in favor of target management.180 The legislative history of the new Maryland statute suggests
that its friendly offer exemption is designed to accommodate target
172. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
173. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
174. See notes 137-41 supra and accompanying text.
175. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 38, at 196; 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 59, at 32;
Fischel, supra note 77, at 31 n.101; Hochman & Folger, supra note 171, at 554.
176. See notes 154-62 supra and accompanying text.
177. See M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 140, § 6.03[2][c] at 6-34.
178. See note 58 supra; see also Hochman & Folger, supra note 171, at 554-55 (deterrent
potential of fair price provision is derived in part from the offeror's loss of control over the
ultimate takeover price).
179. See notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
180. See notes 33 & 38 supra.
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management. Adoption of the exemption was necessary to gain support for the statute from the Maryland business community. 181 The
Maryland friendly offer exemption violates principles of neutrality and
investor autonomy established by the Williams Act. It permits target
management, rather than investors, to decide which takeover attempts
should have the best opportunity for success.182
c. Investor autonomy violations. The criticism that the friendly
offer exemption reduces investor autonomy extends to the Maryland
statute as a whole. The very adoption by the state of a law that deters
takeover attempts reduces shareholder autonomy. Because its shark,repellent provisions are statutorily imposed instead of adopted
through charter amendment, the Maryland approach in effect replaces
investor autonomy with a benevolent bureaucracy. 183 Some commentators184 and the SEC185 have expressed doubt about the validity of
181. Governor Hughes of Maryland vetoed the original version of the new Maryland statute
because it was too broad. At a veto hearing, the executives of a number of Maryland corporations complained that the Bill would unnecessarily apply to friendly takeovers as well as corporate affairs that have no relationship to a takeover. These complaints figured prominently in the
Governor's veto of the original bill. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 50, at 49-51; see also Allen,
Maryland Bill On Takeovers Spurs a Fight, Wall St. J., May 26, 1983, at 33, col. 3.
182. Supporters of friendly offer exemptions argue that target stockholders are benefited by
such exemptions because management gains increased bargaining power in negotiations with the
tender offeror. See Smith, supra note 163, at 7. In granting target management the discretion to
determine which transactions should be subject to the new Maryland law, the Maryland approach relies on management's business judgment and fiduciary duties to protect target shareholders' interests. But see note 92 supra (fiduciary approach is inconsistent with the market
approach of the Williams Act); Hochman & Folger, supra note 171, at 552 (friendly offer exemp. tion might be subject to attack on the ground that it improperly delegates to directors discretionary authority on matters reserved for stockholders).
183. The "benevolent bureaucracy" language has been used to criticize administrative review
provisions in first generation state takeover statutes. See Sargent, supra note 2, at 697; see also
note 32 supra. The term may be appropriate in the Maryland context as well, because the Maryland statute also curtails shareholder freedom to decide which takeover attempts should have the
best opportunity for success.
·
184.[T]he ••. argument [that shark repellent provisions should be encouraged because
they induce tender offerers to negotiate with target management] implies that existing constraints on tender offers do not adequately protect the interests of target shareholders.
There is no reason to believe that such an implication is valid. The Exchange Act imposes
substantive restrictions on tender offers, requires extensive disclosure by the bidder, and
contains an antifraud provision. Additional safeguards arguably conflict with the federal
policy of neutrality which is embodied in the statute. Indeed, shark-repellent amendments
are analogous to state antitakeover laws which delay, and sometimes prevent, the commencement of a tender offer. In part, the antitakeover statutes are undesirable because they
superimpose a pro-management bias on the regulatory scheme created by Congress and the
SEC. This criticism also applies to shark-repellents and provides another reason for opposing their adoption.
Friedenberg, supra note 168, at 84-85 (footnotes omitted); see also Hochman & Folger, supra
note 171, at 554-55 (suggesting that fair price provisions may deter tender offerors more effectively than provisions which merely delay a tender offeror's ability to gain control of a target).
185. The SEC has suggested that shark-repellant amendments "appear to be inconsistent
with the protection of investors." Proposed Amendments To Tender Offer Rules, SEC Securities
Act Release No. 6159, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,385, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 10,959, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,374 at
82,614 (Nov. 29, 1979).
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shark-repellent amendments even when adopted by shareholders. 186
The case against supermajority voting requirements, fair price provisions and friendly offer exemptions is made even stronger when investors do not themselves adopt such measures. 187
The Maryland statute clearly does provide some benefits. It eliminates the coercion inherent in partial and two-tier offers 188 by assuring
nontendering shareholders a voice in the second step or, at least, treatment no worse than that received by tendering shareholders. 189 These
186. Three cases have expressly upheld shark-repellent provisions in corporate charters or
by-laws. See Seibert v. Milton Bradley Co., 386 Mass. 656, 405 N.E. 2d 131 (1980); Providence
& Worchester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977); Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Civ. Action No.
5631 (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979) (reported at 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 514 (1980)), summarily ajfd. 414
A.2d 822 (Del. 1980). All of these cases involved changes in shareholder voting requirements.
The changes had been approved or ratified by the shareholders. But see Moran v. Household
Intl., No. 7730, slip op. (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1985) (unilateral adoption of "poison pill" sharkrepellant provision by corporation's board of directors held valid exercise of business judgment).
Most co=entators view shareholder approval of shark-repellent provisions as an important
element of the provisions' validity. See 1 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 59, at 12-14, 33-34;
Friedenberg, supra note 168, at 49; see also Black & Smith, Antitakeover Charter Provisions:
Defending Self-Help for Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699, 730 (1979). In this
regard, it is significant to note that under the new Maryland law shareholders of Maryland corporations can elect to be exempt from the Maryland law only if they pass a charter amendment
in favor of exemption by a vote of 80% of the outstanding voting shares and a vote of two-thirds
of the voting shares not owned by interested stockholders. Mo. CORPS. & AssNs. CODE ANN.
§ 3-603(e)(l)(ili) (Supp. 1984).
187. The propriety of states statutorily imposing shark-repellent provisions on target shareholders has been questioned by co=entators sympathetic to shareholder adopted shark-repellent amendments:
While it is interesting to speculate on the types of substantive corporate law changes that
might be implemented to deal with the transfer of control, in the final analysis it may be that
no such statutory changes are necessary. The real focus should be on the relationship between all of the stockholders and their willingness to surrender some of their present rights
in favor of preventing one stockholder from gaining absolute control. In short, are stock-

holders willing to forego a potentially profitable tender offer in order to minimize or eliminate
the risk that they or their fellow stockholders may emerge as minority stockholders in a controlled enterprise? From this perspective, the relevant questions are for the stockholders to
decide.
Black & Smith, supra note 186, at 730 (emphasis added).
Theoretically, investors are able to adopt shark-repellent provisions through corporate charter amendments. If this opportunity is open, it makes sense to let investors choose for themselves. The Maryland legislature may have believed, however, that self-help is unavailable in
many cases. The Staff Report to the General Assembly of Maryland states:
It is generally agreed that a company-by-company approach does not solve the problem. It
is unlikely that those companies having a large proportion of institutional investors would
be unable [sic] to get a charter amendment, because it is the institutional investors who
stand to profit most in a takeover.
STAFF REPORT, supra note 41, at 18.
Shark-repellent charter amendments conflict with the interests of institutional investors and
institutional investors have usually voted against them. See TENDER OFFERS, supra note 3, at
259-60; Gilson, supra note 163, at 826-27. However, recent data indicates that shark-repellent
proposals have enjoyed a great deal of success. See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson,
Analysis of Shareholder Response to 1983 Shark Repellent Proposals (May 19, 1983), reprinted
in 2 A. FLEISCHER, supra note 59, at 615-43.
188. See, e.g., Greene & Junewicz, supra note 49, at 676-84; Fair Shares, supra note 49, at
337; see also Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (commenting on the
coercive nature of tender offers in general).
189. Maryland's response to the coerciveness of partial and two-tier offers is similar to the
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benefits are provided, however, at the expense of tender offerors who
are stripped of a useful acquisition technique and, more importantly,
at the expense of those investors who desire to receive tender offers for
their shares. The Maryland statute's potential anti-takeover effect
cannot be reconciled with the concepts of neutrality and investor protection in the Williams Act. 190 The statute is incompatible with congressional objectives in regulating tender offers and is therefore
preempted. 191
CONCLUSION

In Edgar v. MITE Corp. the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional state legislation regulating the tender offer as a means of obtaining corporate control. The MITE decision did not rule out all
forms of state regulation in this area and a number of states have developed a "second generation" of takeover legislation. The new Maryland statute merits special attention. Instead of regulating the tender
offer for a controlling interest in a target corporation, the Maryland
statute purports to protect investors by regulating what the tender offeror may do after gaining working control. The Maryland statute,
through the use of "supermajority" voting requirements and a fair
price provision, restricts the ability of the tender offeror to later
"freezeout" minority shareholders.
While Maryland's new statute bears some resemblance to traditional forms of state regulation of the internal affairs of corporate
domiciliaries, the statute's effect on tender offers and corporate acquisition markets suggests that it has not escaped the constitutional infirmities of predecessor statutes invalidated in MITE. The burdens the
Maryland statute places on interstate commerce outweigh the local
benefits it produces; thus the statute violates the commerce clause.
Furthermore, the regulatory approach of the Maryland statute is inconsistent with the conception of inv~tor protection in the federal
proposals of Professors Brudney and Chirelstein who suggest that the freezeout price should be
equal to the tender offer price. See Fair Shares, supra note 49, at 337; Restatement, supra note
49, at 1361.
190. See notes 105-11 supra and accompanying text. It may be urged that congressional
methods of investor protection have not kept pace with innovative acquisition techniques such as
front-end loaded two-tier offers. Nonetheless, it is for Congress, not the states, to determine what
action, if any, should be taken. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280
n.52 (5th Cir. 1978), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443
U.S. 173 (1979) ("Changing economic conditions may have disrupted the balance that Congress
struck in the Williams Act. But, it is for Congress - not Idaho - to determine if adjustments
in the federal balance are necessary .•••").
191. "Courts have invalidated state tender offer statutes that interfere with the bidder's conduct of a tender offer under federal rules and burden tender offers in interstate commerce. Newly
developed state statutes which, through regulation of target companies, have substantially similar
effects on the ability to conduct a tender offer should not be permitted regardless of the form in
which they are drafted." ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 161, at 34-35 (footnotes omitted).
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tender offer regulatory mechanism, the Williams Act, and is therefore
preempted under the supremacy clause.

